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I. INTRODUCTION

The occupation of real estate broker or real estate agent' began in the
early nineteenth century.' Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, most sales

1. There is a distinction between a real estate broker and a real estate agent. According to
the National Association of Realtors (NAR), an "agent" is "a real estate licensee (including brokers
and sales associates) acting in an agency relationship as defined by state law or regulation." CODE
OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE OF THENATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS STANDARD

1-2 (1995) (amended 1999). According to the NAR, in a particularly circular
definition, a "broker" is "a real estate licensee (including brokers and sales associates) acting as an
agent or in a legally recognized non-agency capacity." Id. According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
65 (7th ed. 1999), a "real-estate agent" is "[a]n agent who represents a buyer or seller (or both, with
proper disclosures) in the sale or lease of real property. A real-estate agent can be either a broker
(whose principal is a buyer or seller) or a salesperson (whose principal is a broker)." Id. The term
"real estate broker" is also defined by state licensing statutes. See, e.g., CAL. BuS. & PROF'L CODE
§ 10131 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. § 82.17(4) (2001); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 440(1) (McKinney
2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2100 (Michie 2002). "Real estate salesperson" is another term that
is used in the licensing statutes and cases. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF'L CODE § 10132 (West
2002); MINN. STAT. § 82.17(5) (2001); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 440(3) (McKinney 2002); VA.
CODEANN. § 54.1-2101 (Michie 2002). In their professional licensing statutes, real estate brokers
and salespersons are also referred to as "licensees." See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.710(15) (2001)
(defining licensee as real estate broker or salesperson). For convenience, this Article will usually
refer to real estate brokers, agents, and salespersons collectively as "real estate brokers" with the
understanding that the same rules apply to all three related, yet at times, distinct groups.
OF PRACTICE

2.

PEARL JANET DAVIES, REAL ESTATEIN AMERICAN HISTORY 20-21

(1958) ("It was in the

rapid city growth of the 1840's that real estate brokerage in the largest cities became a recognized,
established business. In the 1850's this recognition spread across the country."); see id. at 18
(referring to a New York real estate services firm founded in 1794, which soon became a broker
in real estate transactions); D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROIERS § 1.1, at 1:3
(1992) ("The advent of a specialist in real estate brokerage is thus a relatively recent occurrence,

dating from the last half of the nineteenth century.");

STEWART RAPALJE, THE LAW RELATING TO
REAL ESTATEBROKERS, AS DECIDEDBYTHEAMERICAN COURTS iii (1893) ("The business of a real-

estate broker is of comparatively recent origin. Five years ago there were only a few reported
decisions involving the relation of principal and broker with respect to real-estate
transactions .... ).
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of real property involved lawyers and business persons but not real estate

agents as we have come to know them In some instances, parties.to real
estate sales had employees who handled the transactions, but those
employees were not considered real estate agents or brokers.'
Eventually, people began to specialize in facilitating real estate

transactions, and by the mid-nineteenth century real estate brokers, as
such, were involved in several cases both as litigants and as witnesses.'
The first, though short-lived, real estate board was organized in New York

City in 1847.6 Organization of other local real estate boards followed.7

Finally, in 1908, what is now known as the National Association of

Realtors (NAR) was founded These local boards, and later the NAR,
were part of an effort to facilitate real estate exchanges, 9 to improve the
quality of services provided by member brokers, and to encourage ethical

conduct in the profession.'"
Today, the public widely uses real estate brokers in both residential and

commercial property transfers. In 2000, there were about 5,842,000 sales
3. 10 PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.01 [2][b], at
2-9 (1985) ("Until the mid-Nineteenth Century, the principal intermediaries in the real estate sales
transaction were lawyers and other business persons not specialized in real estate."); cf Thruston
v. Thornton, 55 Mass. (I Cush.) 89, 91 (1848) (stating that the plaintiff, "in connection with his
business as an attomey, acted as a real estate broker").
4. See WILLIAM SLEE WALKER, AMERICAN LAW OF REAL ESTATE AGENCY § 7, at 3 (1910)
("a salaried agent, not acting for a fee or commission, is not a broker").
5. See McGavock v. Woodlief, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 221, 225 (1857) (holding that a broker
for the sale of a plantation and slaves was not entitled to commission on facts of the case); Kock
v. Emmerling, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 69, 70-71 (1859) (holding real estate broker entitled to
commission); Bagley v. Eaton, 8 Cal. 159, 163 (1857) (referring to actions of real estate brokers);
Dussuau v. Municipality Number One, 6 La. Ann. 575, 576 (1851) (noting testimony of real estate
broker); Chadwick v. Collins, 26 Pa. 138, 139 (1856) (discussing 1849 Pennsylvania statute
requiring licensing of real estate brokers); In re Harland's Accounts, 5 Rawle 323, 329 (Pa. 1835)
(referring to testimony of real estate brokers); Miller v. Jacobs, 3 Watts 477, 481 (Pa. 1835)
(quoting deposition of"a conveyancer and broker of real estate" who stated that he had "been in
that occupation for thirty-three years"); Van Hook v. Somerville Mfg. Co., 5 N.J. Eq. 137, 1845
N.J. Super. LEXIS 32, at *26 (N.J. Ch. 1845) (citing testimony of real estate broker); Glentworth
v. Luther, 21 Barb. 145, 145 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1855).
6. DAVIES, supranote 2, at 21 (discussing creation of New York Real Estate Exchange).
7. Id. at 26 (discussing the Baltimore Board of Real Estate in 1858).
8. Id. at 58 (discussing the creation of the National Association of Real Estate Exchanges
in 1908); BURKE, supranote 2, at § 1.3 (stating that the NAR was founded in 1908).
9. See DAVES,supra note 2, at26 (stating that early boards "provided a market convenience
among men of standing, a trading place, where these men could exchange listings").
10. Id. at 26 (stating that boards were concerned "with the ethics of real estate business, and
that means protection of the public in its real estate transactions"). The NAR has a code of ethics
with a stated goal "to eliminate practices which may damage the public or which might discredit
or bring dishonor to the real estate profession." Preambleto CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF
PRACTICE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS (2000); available at http:l/websrvl.
realtors.org/ realtor.nsf/pages/2000code.
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of existing homes in the United States and about 877,000 sales of new
privately-owned one-family houses.11 An estimated 81% of home sales
involve real estate brokers."l There are reportedly over two million real
estate brokers and salespeople in the United States, 3 of which over
750,000 are members of NAR."4 With the volume of real estate that is
transferred each year, it comes as no surprise that disputes associated with
real property sales abound and that many of these cases involve real estate
brokers as defendants.
This Article first explores the history of real estate broker liability and
various theories for liability of real estate brokers to purchasers of real
property. Then it considers statutory and contractual provisions limiting
real estate brokers' potential liability. In particular, this Article focuses on
how courts construe and apply the "as is" clause and similar exculpatory
clauses. This Article concludes that these clauses are, and should be,
viewed with skepticism, and it suggests that courts should not enforce
exculpatory clauses in residential real estate sales contracts unless the
broker can prove that the disclaimers were actually agreed to by the
purchasers and that the clauses adequately identify the qualities
disclaimed. These requirements are necessary to ensure that purchasers
genuinely understand and knowingly accept the risks purportedly allocated
by such provisions.
II. THEORIES OF REAL ESTATE BROKER LIABILITY
A. HistoricallyCaveat Emptor ProtectedBrokers and Sellers
1. The Rise of Caveat Emptor
Historically, the doctrine of caveat emptor protected sellers and their
agents, including brokers, from liability to disappointed buyers. Caveat
11.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMNERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE

NATIONAL DATA BOOK 598, 600 (21st ed., Nos. 939 & 944, 2001).
12. See The ResidentialReal Estate BrokerageIndustry, 1 FTCA STAFF REPORTBY THE L.A.

REG'L OFFICE, 1, 8 (1983) (giving 81% statistic); see also BURKE, supra note 2, § 1.1, at 3
(estimating that brokers handle 90% of all home sales).

13. Association of Real Estate License Law Officials, DIGEST OF REAL ESTATE LICENSE
LAWS AND CURRENTISSUES (ed. 2000). The DIGESTOF REAL ESTATELICENSELAWS AND CURRENT

ISSUES reports the number of licensed brokers and salespersons by state in 1999. Id.Based on those
figures, in 1999 there were over 696,778 brokers and 1,468,481 salespersons in the United States.
See id. (including data from all states except Minnesota).
14. See NAR Official Website, at http:llwww.realtor.org/realtororg. nsf/pages/HowtoJoin?
(last visited Mar. 30, 2002). The "overwhelming majority" of active brokers and salespersons are
members of the NAR. See The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry, 1 FTC, A STAFF
REPORT BY THE L.A. REG'L OFFICE 15 (1983).
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emptor, or "buyer beware,"' 5 stood for the rule that a buyer of real
property assumed the risk of defects in the property. 6 The complete
maxim was: "caveat emptor, qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum
emit," translated, "[1]et a purchaser beware, who ought not to be ignorant
that he is purchasing the right of another,"17 or by a second translation, "let
the purchaser exercise proper caution, for he ought not be ignorant of the
amount and nature of that person's interest which he is about to
purchase."' 8 Caveat emptor at one time included defects in both title and
quality.' 9 The buyer had no recourse against the seller unless the seller
made covenants or contractual warranties concerning the property.
Until relatively recently, reflecting the United States' and England's
agrarian roots, the greatest value of real property was the land itself, not
the improvements on the land." As a result, the quality of title to the land

15. One historical authority defined "caveat emptor" as standing for the rule: "Let the
purchaser take heed; that is, let him see to it, that the title he is buying is good. This is a rule of the
common law, applicable to the sale and purchase of lands and other real estate." JOHN BOUVIER,
A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, AND OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THEAMERICAN UNION; WITH REFERENCES TO THE CIVIL

AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF FOREIGN LAW 212 (7th ed. 1857).
16. At common law, the rule applied to real and personal property. See, e.g., Barnard v.
Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383,388-89 (1870) (discussing the rule as applied to sales of personal
property); Blodget v. Brent, 3 F. Cas. 719, 720 (C.C.D.C. 1828) (No. 1,553) (applying the rule to
real property); Stebbins v. Eddy, 22 F. Cas. 1192, 1195 (C.C.D. R.I. 1827) (No. 13,342) (applying
the rule to real property); Hurst v. McNeil, 12 F. Cas. 1039, 1042 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 6, 936)
(applying the rule to real property); Seixas & Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48, 54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1804) (applying the rule to sale of wood); Brock v. Philips, 2 Va. (I Wash.) 68 (1795) (applying
the rule to real property); LAWRENCEM. FRIEDMAN, AHISTORYOFAMERICANLAW264-65, 540-41
(2d ed. 1985) (discussing caveat emptor in America in the context of the history of commercial law
and the sale of goods).
17. Spade v. Salvatorian Fathers, Mother of Savior Seminary, 189 A.2d 738,744 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. Law Div. 1963); see also Barnard v. Duncan, 38 Mo. 170, 187 (Mo. 1866) (stating a slightly
different translation (quoting HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND
ILLUSTRATED 354 (1845))).
18. HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED 181
(1845).
19. See HERBERT BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED
528 (10th ed. 1939) (stating that "caveatemptor applies, with certain specific restrictions, not only
to the quality of, but also to the title to land which is sold"); BROOM, supra note 18, at 187
(discussing applicability of the rule to both quality and title of real property); 2 RICHARD
WOODDESSON, LECTURES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 251 n.m (2d ed. 1834) (noting that caveat
emptor "seems to have been originally applicable, not to the quality, but the title, of the goods
sold"); cf 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 477-78 (4th ed. 1840) (discussing
personal property and claiming that the rule applies to quality of goods, but fair price implies a
warranty of title).
20. See Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 142-43 (Ct. App, 1976), aftd,235 S.E.2d 532 (Ga.
1977) (observing that "the sale of farm acreage cum simple residence-the type of transaction to
which caveat emptor originally addressed itself-is very different from the sale of a modem home,
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and right to possession were frequently the basis of dispute rather than the
condition of improvements on the land. In connection with leases, courts
applied caveat emptor and found no implied warranty as to the fitness of
the premises for habitation or other particular uses."' As society became
more urban, disputes regarding the condition of improvements took on
greater significance. Caveat emptor, however, continued to be the rule and
denied recovery in most cases.
The origins of the doctrine of caveat emptor can be traced to early
Roman law.22 Ironically, Roman law ultimately rejected the doctrine" and
instead opted for the rule of "caveat venditor" or "let the seller beware." 4
Caveat venditor implied a general warranty of quality in the law of all
sales.2 Professor Charles Sherman explained:
In Roman law the seller warranted the thing sold, whether
movable or immovable, to be free from latent defects or
secret faults. If the buyer subsequently discovered in the thing
sold a latent defect or vice, unknown to the seller, which
renders it useless or unsuited to its purpose or diminished in
value, he could elect either to sue for the annulment of the
sale or to sue for a reduction of the price.2 6
with complex plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and electrical systems, which is possibly built
on ground considered unsuitable for construction until recent years").
21. See l EMORY WASHBURN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 35758 (2d ed. 1864) (stating that "in the absence of fraud on the part of the lessor, there is no implied
warranty that the premises are fit for the use for which the lessee requires them").
22. See JAMES MACKINTOSH, THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE WITH MODERN ILLUSTRATIONS:
DIGEST XVIII. I AND XIX. I TRANSLATED WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CASES AND THE SALE
OF GOODS ACT 278 (2d ed. 1907) (noting that caveat emptor was the starting point for evolution
of warranty and stating that "Itihe primitive law knew nothing of implied warranty of quality, and
it is very doubtful if even express declarations ... could be enforced"); WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE
PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION TO MODERN LAW 445 (1938) (stating that in a
contract for sale, under "the early law of Rome," the seller was liable only for fraud or breach of
express warranty).
23. See Alan M. Weinberger, Let the Buyer Be Well Informed? - Doubting the Demise of
Caveat Emptor, 55 MD. L. REV. 387, 391 & n.30 (1996); BURDICK, supra note 22, at 445 (noting
seller's liability under implied warranty ofquality). According to Professor Max Radin, "[tihe evil
and cynical rule of caveatemptor was abrogated, in practice and in law, at Rome some time before
the Christian era... ." MAX RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW § 83, at 231 (1927).
24. According to Professor Walton Hamilton, the actual phrases "caveat emptor" and "caveat
venditor" were not used in Roman Law. See Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALEL.J. 1133, 1156-57 (1931) (regarding caveat emptor, "[n]o Roman author whose
works survive seems to have scribbled the two words down"); id. at 1158 & n.168 (concluding that
there is no evidence of words "caveat emptor" in Roman law, and "the expression caveat
venditor ... is an invention of a modem scholarship").
25. 2 CHARLES PHINEAS SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW INTHE MODERN WORLD § 790, at 347
(1937).
26. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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England and the United States, however, embraced the rule of caveat
emptor. In the English common law, the phrase "caveat emptor" first
appeared in print in 1534 in a text concerning horse trading.27 Later, Sir
Edward Coke applied the term caveat emptor early in the seventeenth
century to landlord and tenant liability. 28 Although it did not use the words
"caveat emptor," the famous case of Chandelor v. Lopus,29 reported in
1603, is widely credited with originating the common law rule of caveat
emptor.3 ° In that case, the defendant goldsmith sold what he "affirmed" to
be a "bezar-stone" to the plaintiff for a considerable sum.31 A "bezarstone" or "bezoar stone"32 was a stone found in the stomach or intestines
of certain animals, such as a goat, and was believed to have magical
powers. 3 The plaintiff claimed that in fadt the stone was not a bezar-stone
and alleged breach of warranty.34 The court found for the defendant
because the defendant had merely "affirmed" but not "warranted" the

27. In a discussion of"wartes" on a horse, the source stated: "if he be tame and have ben
rydden upon, then Caveat emptor, beware the byer, for the byer hath bothe his eyen to se, and his
handes to handell." MASTER FITZHERBERT, THE BOOK OF HUSBANDRY § 118 (Rev. Walter W.
Skeat, M.A., ed., reprint 1882) (1534).
28. He wrote:
Note, that by the Civil Law every man is bound to warrant the thing that he selleth
or conveyeth, albeit there be no expresse Warranty, but the Common Law bindeth
him not, unlesse there be a warrantie, either in Deed or in Law for Caveatemptor,
as shall be said more at large in the chapter of Warrantie in the third booke.
I SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAwES OF ENGLAND. OR, A
LITTrLTON NOT THE NAME OF A LAWYER ONLY, BUT OF THE LAW IT SELFE
§ 145, at 102 (lst ed. 1628).
29. 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex. Ch. 1603).
30. See McVeigh v. Messersmith, 16 F. Cas. 351 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 8,931) (citing
Chandelorin support of caveat emptor); Seixas & Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48,53-54 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1804) (citing Chandeloras support for adopting rule of caveat emptor); Barnard v. Yates, 10
S.C.L. (1 Nott& McC.) 142, 147 (Const. Ct. S.C. 1818) (citing Chandeloras example of English
rule of caveat emptor).
31. Chandelor,79 Eng. Rep. at 3-4.
32. The cases use various spellings including "bezar-stone," "bezoar stone," and "bezer
stone." See id. (using bezar-stone); McVeigh, 16 F. Cas. at 351 (using bezar stone); Seixas &
Seixas, 2 Cai. R. at 52 (using bezoar stone); see alsoNote, 8 HARV. L. REV. 282,283 (1894) (using
bezer stone). The most popular spelling in the cases appears to be "bezoar stone." See 2 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 163 (2d ed. 1989) (listing under entry "bezoar" nineteen different
forms of the word).
33. Bezoar or bezoar-stone was believed to be a"counter-poison or antidote," "[a] calculus
or concretion found in the stomach or intestines of some animals, chiefly ruminants, formed of
concentric layers of animal matter deposited round some foreign substance, which serves as a
nucleus." 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 163 (2d ed. 1989).
34. See Chandelor,79 Eng. Rep. at 4.
COMMENTARIE UPON
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stone to be a bezar-stone." The case was interpreted by later courts to
mean that36the fairness of the bargain was irrelevant unless there was a
warranty.

The doctrine of caveat emptor became well entrenched in American
jurisprudence," although it had its critics.38 However, by the middle to late

35. Id. The court, with one dissent, held:
for the bare affirmation that it was a bezar-stone, without warranting it to be so,
is no cause of action: and although he knew it to be no bezar-stone, it is not
material; for every one in selling his wares will affirm that his wares are good, or
the horse which he sells is sound; yet if he does not warrant them to be so, it is no
cause of action.
Id.
36. Commentators have questioned whether Chandelor was actually good authority for
ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 179 (1979)
(questioning later interpretations of Chandeloras"highly suspect" and finding it "extraordinary that
this case should have been regarded as laying the foundation of the later law of caveat emptor");
Hamilton, supra note 24, at 1167-68 ("It is not easy to extract the law of that day from the uncertain
record of the case.... It is... the case recreated, rather than the case decided, which takes its place
in history."). Lopus apparently successfully pled a second action alleging the goldsmith knowingly
misrepresented the stone to be a "Bezers Stone." See Note, 8 HARV. L. REv. 282, 283-84 (1894)
(discussing Chandelorand the subsequent opinion); Hamilton, supra note 24, at 1168 (discussing
Chandelorand buyer's victory).
37. See Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388-89 (1870) (stating, in a personal
property case, "[o]f such universal acceptance is the doctrine of caveatemptor in this country, that
the courts of all the States in the Union where the common law prevails, with one exception (South
Carolina), sanction it"); Blodget v. Brent, 3 F. Cas. 719, 720 (C.C.D.C. 1828) (No. 1,553)
(applying caveat emptor to preserve dower right in real property purchased by defendant); Stebbins
v. Eddy, 22 F. Cas. 1192, 1195 (C.C.D. R.I. 1827) (No. 13,342) ("Where the sale [of land] is fair,
and the parties are equally innocent, and the quantity is sold by estimation .... there is little, if any
hardship, and much convenience in holding to the rule, caveat emptor."); Hurst v. McNeil, 12 F.
Cas. 1039, 1042 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 6,936) (stating that caveat emptor preserved the legal title
of part owner of Penn's Manor over an innocent purchaser); Mason v. Evans, 1793 WL 453, at *5
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1793) (Chetwood, J., concurring) (stating that defendant could not defend case to
recover payment of a bond on ground that plaintiff did not have title to land sold to defendant as
consideration for bond; caveat emptor applied); Seixas & Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48, 53-54
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (involving sale of wood, maxim of caveat emptor applied; purchaser should
have required a warranty if one was desired); Brock v. Philips, 2 Va. (1 Wash.) 68, 70 (1795)
(applying caveat emptor, finding that purchaser of real property had no claim for defective title);
cf Waddill v. Chamberlayne, 1735 Va. LEXIS 3, at * 1 (Va. 1735) (stating counsel argued for stay
ofjudgment, relying on the doctrine of caveat emptor).
38. See Seixas & Seixas,2 Cal. R. at 53 (noting Wooddesson's criticism of caveat emptor and
his call for the more reasonable principle that a fair price implies a warranty); Barnard,10 S.C.L.
(1 Nott & McC.) at 147 (rejecting rule of caveat emptor and agreeing with Cooper that caveat
emptor was "a disgrace to the law"); I THEOPHILUS PARSONS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTs 461 (3d
ed. 1857) (noting that the rule "is apparently severe, and it sometimes works wrong and hardship"
and that "it has been commented upon in terms of strong reproach, not only by the community, but
by members of the legal profession"); THOMAS COOPER, THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 556 (2d ed.

caveat emptor. See P.S.
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nineteenth century, caveat emptor in personal property cases began to give
way to implied warranties. The courts first found the existence of an
implied warranty of title to personal property.39 Under the implied
warranty of title, a seller of personal property impliedly warranted that the
seller owned the chattel free and clear of encumbrances or any superior
claims, unless circumstances or words indicated otherwise. 40 Although
courts were willing to imply warranty of title, they initially continued to
follow the rule of caveat emptor as it concerned quality of personal
property.41 Yet even in the area of warranties of quality, important
exceptions or limitations to the rule of caveat emptor were widely
recognized. 42 Beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing into
the twentieth century, caveat emptor gave way to implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 43 Today, the Uniform

1841) (arguing that "[t]he rule of caveat emptor, ought to be changed into caveatvenditor. It is a
disgrace to the law that such a maxim should be adopted...."); WOODDESSON, supra note 19, at
251 (calling caveat emptor, "a very unconscientious maxim" and noting "a more reasonable
principle" of implied warranty).
39. See CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY, INCLUDING THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES § 185, at 264-65 (1891) (recognizing
under early English rule, there was no implied warranty of title for personal property, but finding
now "there are implied warranties of title in very many sales of personal property"); EDMUND H.
BENNETT & SAMUEL C. BENNETT, BENJAMIN'S TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY; WITH REFERENCES TO THE AMERICAN DECISIONS AND TO THE FRENCH CODE AND CIVIL

LAW § 639, at 630 (7th Am. ed. 1899) (noting that "[t]he exceptions have become the rule"; the
new rule is that the seller warrants title unless facts and circumstances show otherwise); SAMUEL
WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFORM

SALES ACT § 216-18, at 286-90 (1909) (quoting § 13 of the Uniform Sales Act imposing implied
warranties of title, and discussing history).
40. See FRANCIS B. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 76, at 242 (2d ed. 1908)
(stating that seller impliedly warrants that he has title to goods "unless a contrary intention
appears"). Some courts limited the implied warranty to cases in which the seller was in possession
ofthe goods. Id.; see alsoBENNETT&BENNETT, supranote 39, § 641, at 631-32 (noting distinction
between vendor in possession and vendor out of possession).
41. See BENNETT & BENNETT, supra note 39, § 644, at 633 (stating in 1899: "The maxim of
the common law, caveat emptor, is the general rule applicable to sales, so far as quality is
concerned."); TIFFANY, supra note 40, § 78, at 252 (stating that in 1908 caveat emptor was the
general rule applicable to quality in sales of goods).
42. See, e.g., Wright v. Hart, 18 Wend. 449, 453-56 (N.Y. 1837) (discussing exceptions:
order from manufacturer for particular use, sale of provisions, sale with no opportunity to inspect,
and sale by sample); TIFFANY, supra note 40, § 78, at 252 (noting implied warranties of fitness for
particular purpose and fitness for consumption, and in goods bought by description); id. § 79, at 262
(noting implied warranty in sales by sample). One treatise stated: "The doctrine of caveat emptor,
however, has so many limitations that it must be read in the light of what are sometimes called
exceptions, but which are really independent rules and principles." BENNETT & BENNETT, supra
note 39, at 682 n.13; see also id. at 683-93, nn.14-17 (discussing particular exceptions).
43. See, e.g., Murchie v. Cornell, 29 N.E. 207, 207 (Mass. 1891) (stating in some
circumstances, "the court properly may instruct the jury that the word means more than its bare

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVEW

[Vol. 54

Commercial Code and state law impose implied warranties of title,
merchantability, and fitness for a particular purpose in connection with the
sale of goods in many circumstances. 44
Developments in the law of real property did not follow the
developments in the law of personal property. Caveat emptor continued to
govern leases and sales of real property even after it was abandoned in
connection with the sale of personal property.45 Some commentators
attribute the move away from caveat emptor in personal property to the
rise of mass production of goods in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. 4" Also, changing commercial conditions placed greater
distance between manufacturers and retail purchasers, and, at the same
time, purchasers' expectations increased. 47 These same considerations did
not apply immediately to real property. Under the common law, real
property was considered unique, the antithesis of mass produced fungible
items. Sales occurred directly between the seller and purchaser or between
the seller's agent and purchaser. Frequently, an individual already owned
a parcel of land and then hired a contractor to build on the land.4' After
World War II, however, mass production of houses began, and builderdevelopers sold new houses and land together, creating a new dynamic in

definition in the dictionary, and calls for a merchantable article of that name"); BARKLEY CLARK
& CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES 1.01 [2], at 1-4 (1984) (discussing
history and adoption of the Uniform Sales Act and later the U.C.C.).
44. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to 2-315 (2001) (imposing warranty of title, implied warranty of
merchantability, and implied warranty of fitness).
45. See, e.g., Bonner v. Sikes, 727 S.W.2d 144, 146 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (noting implied
warranties in sale of personal property, but caveat emptor in sale of real estate); McDonald v.
Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283, 1288 (N.J. 1979) (noting critically the different treatment of personal
and real property); Bank One, Cincinnati v. Wait, 674 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(noting abolition of caveat emptor in personal property area, but remaining viability in real estate
sales); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 cmt. a (1965) ("As to sales of land this rule has
retained much of its original force, and the implied warranties which have grown up around the sale
of chattels never have developed."); 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 926, at 779 (3d ed. 1963) ("The doctrine of caveatemptor so far as
the title of personal property is concerned is very nearly abolished, but in the law of real estate it
is still in force."); Leo Bearman, Jr., CaveatEmptor in Sales ofRealty-Recent Assaults Upon the
Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541,542 (1961) ("Though the ominous sounding doctrine of caveat emptor
has all but disappeared from the purchase of chattels.., it still clings tenaciously to the black letter
law of sales of realty....
"); see also 1 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF
REAL PROPERTY § 1.2(n), at 48 & n.2 (6th ed, 1998) (stating that in the ordinary sale of realty,
caveat emptor "not only applies, it flourishes" and finding that it is still the general rule).
46, CLARK & SMITH, supra note 43, 1.0112], at 1-4; Bearman, supra note 45, at 542;
FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, at 265.
47. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 43, 1.01 [2], at 1-4.
48. See E.F. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing MerchantDidIt,
52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
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the real estate market.49 This mass production and changed market,
coupled with changing attitudes,"° gradually led to greater protections for
purchasers and substantial erosion of caveat emptor.5 1
2. The Decline, But Not Fall, of Caveat Emptor
Caveat emptor in the sale of real property, depending upon the
jurisdiction and the authority consulted, is alternatively (1) still the rule,

(2) abandoned, or (3) still relevant, but partially abandoned. Most courts
and commentators probably would agree that caveat emptor has been

sharply limited but continues to play a role in real property sales in most
jurisdictions.
a. Implied Warranty of Marketability and Title Covenants
Early on, courts began to imply in contracts for the sale of real property
a duty to convey marketable title unless the contract provided otherwise. 2
This, in essence, was an implied warranty that the seller had good title to
the real property. 3 The usefulness of this implied duty was limited to the

49. Id.
50. Some attributed the broad acceptance of caveat emptor to laissez faire attitudes that
dominated earlier times. Id. at 836.
51. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 45, § 1.2(n), at 71 (noting the "extraordinary number of new
housing units built, often hurriedly, since about 1945," at times followed by poor results); Roberts,
supranote 48, at 837 (noting transformation of housing industry after World War II; "the building
industry outgrew the old notion that the builder was an artisan and took on all the color of a
manufacturing enterprise"). The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the rationale this way:

Caveatemptor developed when the buyer and seller were in an equal bargaining
position and they could readily be expected to protect themselves in the deed.
Buyers of mass produced development homes are not on an equal footing with the
builder vendors and are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than are
automobile purchasers in a position to protect themselves in the bill of sale.
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 326 (N.J. 1965).
52. See Wallach v. Riverside Bank, 100N.E. 50,51 (N.Y. 1912) ("agreementto make agood
title is always implied in executory contracts for the sale of land"); Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N.Y. 535,
541-44 (1854) (finding implied covenant to convey good title in every contract for sale of land
unless expressly provided otherwise in the contract); Goddin v. Mason, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 102, 117
(1858) (stating when sale of real estate is made without stipulations as to title, purchaser is entitled
to clear title); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 775 (3d ed.
2000) ("It infers in every realty sale contract, unless a contrary intent appears, a covenant that the
title transferred will be free of all reasonable risk of attack-in other words, that it will be
marketable."). The requirements for marketable title may be defined by the contract or by local law
and usually include some qualifications such as covenants of record and public utility easements.
53. One historic authority explained the right to marketable title this way:
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period when the contract was executory because, under the doctrine of
merger, after the deed conveyed the property, any contractual obligations
were merged into the deed.54 The purchaser's only remedies after
conveyance were for fraud or based on warranties or covenants in the
deed, not on any implied duties under the sales contract.
Warranties and covenants of title in transfer of real property have a
long history in the common law." As early as 1272, use of the Latin word
"dedi" in a charter or deed implied a warranty of title by the grantor.5 6
These early warranties had limitations, however, and by the end of the
seventeenth century, title covenants were introduced as a substitute for
warranties." In America, deeds typically contained covenants of title.
Eventually, warranty deeds,5" distinguished from other deeds by inclusion
of covenants of title, became the preferred method for conveying real
property. 9 Under these covenants, the seller covenants, among other
things, that he or she is the owner of the real property and has the right to
convey the property.6" These covenants provide some protection to

The right to a good title, is a right not growing out of the agreement between the
parties, but given by the law,-the purchaser being entitled to have a clear title
shown, not merely on the ground that it is stipulated for by the agreement: but on
the footing of the principle growing out of the nature of the contract, that as the
purchaser parts with good money, the vendor shall give in return an estate with a
clear title.
S. Atkinson, An Essay on Marketable or Doubtful Titles to Real Estate in Section 379, in 20 THE
LAW LIBRARY 168 (Thomas I. Wharton ed., 1838).
54. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 52, at 785 (discussing merger and noting that
modem courts limit the merger doctrine to covenants concerning title, allowing other contract
covenants to survive the deed); see also Pybus v. Grasso, 59 N.E.2d 289, 291 (Mass. 1945)
(applying merger doctrine); Mason v. Loveless, 24 P.3d 997, 1002-03 (Utah Ct. App. 2001)
(applying merger doctrine).
55. For the history and development of title covenants, see WILLIAM HENRY RAWLE, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR TITLE (5th ed. 1887).
56. See id. at 2 (citing statute de bigamis); Burwell v. Jackson, 9 N.Y. 535, 541 (1854)
("Originally, the customary words of conveyance in a deed amounted to a warranty; as the word
dedi in a feoffnent, or concessi in a grant for years."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 421 (7th ed.
1999) (defining "dedi" and noting that word implies warranty of title).
57. RAWLE, supra note 55, at 11.
58. The form and effect of warranty deeds are defined by state statute and common law. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 689.02-.03 (West 2002) (directing form and effect of warranty deed);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.07 (West 2002) (directing form and effect of warranty deed); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 477:27 (2000) (directing form and effect of warranty deed).
59. RAWLE, supra note 55, at 11-12.
60. See 14 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 81A.0612][a], [b], [d]
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) (discussing covenants of seisin, right to convey, and warranty); see
also, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-206 (Michie 1995) (stating covenant of seisin "shall be

interpreted as a covenant that the grantor has good title to the very estate in quantity and quality
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purchasers from title defects and ouster, and caveat emptor has no
application to claims within the scope of the covenants.61 Of course, title
covenants, as their name implies, address defects in title but not defects in
the quality of the real property.62
b. Implied Warranties of Habitability and Workmanship
In a significant departure from caveat emptor, courts now generally
impose an implied warranty of habitability and an implied warranty of
workmanship in sales of new homes by vendor-builders.63 This departure
from caveat emptor began as a limited exception in cases in which a
purchaser contracted for the building of a house or bought a house under
construction but not yet completed? 4 Later, courts extended the implied

which he purports to convey").
61. The covenants of title are covenants: for seisin, for right to convey, against
encumbrances, of warranty, for quiet enjoyment, and for further assurance. See STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supranote 52, at 907-10. Which covenants of title are contained in a deed depend upon
the express language of the deed and local law. Id.Use of certain words, by statute or common law,
will invoke particular covenants. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 689.02-.03 (West 2002) (directing
form and effect of warranty deed); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.07 (West 2002) (directing form and
effect of warranty deed); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-206 (Michie 1996) (giving language
necessary to invoke covenant ofseisin); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:27 (2000) (directing form and
effect of warranty deed).
62. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 52, at 907.
63. For representative cases imposing implied warranties of workmanship and habitability
in the purchase of new houses, see Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So. 2d 313 (Ala. 1971); Wawak v.
Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970); Carpenterv.Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964); Gable
v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Dist. Ct. App.), opinion adoptedby264So. 2d418 (Fla. 1972); Bethlahmy
v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966); Smith v. Old Warson Development Co., 479 S.W.2d 795
(Mo. 1972); McDonaldv.Mianecki, 398 A.2d 1283 (N.J. 1979); DeRoche v. Dame,430 N.Y.S.2d
390 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Vanderschrierv.Aaron, 140 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Jones
v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1974); Elderkin
v. Gaster,288 A.2d 771 (Pa. 1972); Waggonerv. MidwesternDevelopment, Inc., 154N.W.2d 803
(S.D. 1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Rothbergv. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461
(Vt. 1970); House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969); Gamble v. Main, 300 S.E.2d 110
(W.Va. 1983); Tavaresv. Horstman,542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). Some states have imposed these
implied warranties by statute. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-118 (2001); MD. CODEANN.,
Real Prop. § 10-203 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70.01 (Michie 1995).
64. The leading case was an English case, Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113
(1931). In Miller, the court drew a sharp distinction between existing, unfurnished houses and
houses to be built or under construction. Id. at 121. The court stated:
The position is quite different when you contract with a builder or with the owners
of a building estate in course of development that they shall build a house for you
or that you shall buy a house which is then in the course of erection by them.
There the whole object, as both parties know, is that there shall be erected a house
in which the intended purchaser shall come to live. It is the very nature and
essence of the transaction between the parties that he will have a house put up
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warranties to cover all newly constructed houses, thus protecting
purchasers of already completed newly constructed homes.65 These new
implied warranties are an important shift away from caveat emptor, but
they are far from a complete abandonment of the doctrine. Often, the
implied warranties are limited to the original purchasers of new homes and
do not apply to subsequent purchasers66 or to used homes.67 The implied

warranties only apply to builder-vendors, not the typical homeowner
selling his or her house.68 Caveat emptor also continues to control in cases
of new non-residential buildings or investment properties.69

there which is fit for him to come into as a dwelling-house. It is plain that in those
circumstances there is an implication of law that the house shall be reasonably fit
for the purpose for which it is required, that is for human dwelling.
Id.
65. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399,402 (Colo. 1964) (extending rule in Miller
to "newly constructed buildings, completed at the time of contracting"). The court in Carpenter.
explained:
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near
completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems
incongruous. To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and-the
latter cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.
Id.
66. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Plemmons, 849 P.2d 838, 840 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (limiting to
first purchaser); Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 378 A.2d 599, 601 (Conn. 1977) (limiting to
original purchaser); McCann v. Brody-Built Const. Co., 496 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Mich. Ct. App,
1992) ("Such warranties apply only to the first purchaser of a home."); Brown v. Fowler, 279
N.W.2d 907, 910 (S.D. 1979) (requiring privity with builder). But see Richards v. Powercraft
Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984) (extending warranties to protect subsequent
purchasers); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (Ind. 1976) (extending
warranties to protect second purchaser); Barlage v. Key Bank of Wyo., 892 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo.
1995) (noting that implied warranty has been extended to remote purchasers).
67. See Hines v. Thornton, 913 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (applying implied
warranties only to sale of new houses).
68. See, e.g., Paukovitz v. Imperial Homes, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 473, 475 (II!. App. Ct. 1995)
("plaintiff must prove that the defendant was the builder-vendor of the home"); Choung v. lemma,
708 N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to apply implied warranty against non-builder
seller); Barlage, 892 P.2d at 126 (limiting implied warranty to sale of improved property by
builder).
69. See Conklin v. Hurley, 428 So. 2d 654,658-59 (Fla. 1983) (holding no implied warranties
when purchasers of lot with defective seawall bought properties as investment for resale); Haskell
Co. v. Lane Co., 612 So. 2d 669, 674 (Fla. I st DCA 1993) (stating that caveat emptor continues to
apply to sales of commercial properties); Hays v. Gilliam, 655 S.W.2d 158, 160-61 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1983) (refusing to find implied warranty of habitability in used apartment building); cf Frickel v.
Sunnyside Enters., Inc., 725 P.2d 422, 423 (Wash. 1986) (finding no implied warranty of
habitability in commercial apartment transaction where apartments not built for resale and where
contract had a disclaimer). But see Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022, 1032 (Idaho 1987)

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss3/2

14

Dallon: Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability and the Effect of the "A
THEORIES Or REAL ESTATE BROKER LIABILITY

Beginning in the early 1960s, courts also made a dramatic shift away
from caveat emptor in the context of residential leases where they began
to impose a warranty of habitability.70 Again, however, caveat emptor
continues to be the majority rule in commercial leases. 7
c. Seller's Duty to Disclose Known Material Defects
In addition to title covenants and implied warranties in new homes and
residential leases, many courts have gone a step further and impose a duty
on all sellers of residential real estate to disclose known material defects

(implied warranty of habitability extended to purchase of income-producing duplexes); Hodgson
v. Chin, 403 A.2d 942, 945 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (finding implied warranty of
reasonable workmanship and habitability in building consisting of two small stores and two
apartments).
70. See, e.g., Green v. SuperiorCourt, 517 P.2d 1168,1 170 (Cal. 1974) (recognizing implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (finding implied warranty of habitability in all leases of urban dwellings);
Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (Wis. 1961) (rejecting caveat emptor and implying
warranty of habitability in residential leases); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supranote 52, § 6.38, at
299-301 (discussing implied warranties of habitability in leases). Many states have imposed by
statute the equivalent of an implied warranty of habitability in residential leases. See, e.g., N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney 2001) (imposing warranty of habitability); TEX. PROP. ANN.
CODE §§ 92.051-.262 (Vernon 1995) (imposing duties on landlords and granting remedies to
tenants); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-22-1 to 57-22-6 (2000) (providing the Utah Fit Premises Act,
imposing warranty of habitability); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra, note 52, § 6.38, at 301
(discussing habitability statutes).
71. A majority ofjurisdictions refuse to find an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose in commercial leases. See, e.g., Sauve v. Winfree, 985 P.2d 997, 1001 (Alaska 1999)
("Only a few states-New Jersey, New York, California, and Texas-have moved toward
recognizing an implied warranty of fitness or suitability in commercial leases."); Cho Mark
Oriental Food v. K & K Int'l, 836 P.2d 1057, 1061 n.l (Haw. 1992) (noting that "this court has
never extended the theory [of implied warranties] to commercial leases," and observing that "[fJew
jurisdictions have done so"); Bd. of Dirs. of Bloomfield Club Recreation Ass'n v. Hoffman Group,
Inc., 692 N.E.2d 825, 828 (II. App. Ct. 1998) ("implied warranty of habitability does not extend
to commercial leases"); Chausse v. Coz, 540 N.E.2d 667, 669 (Mass. 1989) (finding no implied
warranty of habitability in commercial lease); B.W.S. Invs. v. Mid-Am Restaurants, Inc., 459
N.W.2d 759, 763 (N.D. 1990) (adopting majority view, rejecting implied warranty in commercial
lease); Truetried Serv. Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating caveat
emptor applies to commercial leases). For the minority rule, see Davidow v. Inwood North
ProfessionalGroup, 747 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. 1988).
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in the property.' Following the leading case of Lingsch v. Savage,73 the
rule in California is
where the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property which are known or accessible
only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to,
or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation
of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the
buyer.74
A breach of this common law duty of disclosure may result in either
rescission or damages.75 Courts imposing a duty of disclosure view
nondisclosure of known material facts as actionable fraud.76 One court
held a builder-developer liable for nondisclosure of even off-site physical
conditions materially affecting the property."
Other jurisdictions, however, continue to apply caveat emptor and
place no affirmative duty upon sellers to disclose defects. 78 All

72. See, e.g., Assilzadeh v. Cal. Fed. Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 182 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(noting duty to disclose); Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (finding duty to
disclose material facts); Flakus v. Schug, 329 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Neb. 1983) (stating there is a duty
to disclose material facts in some circumstances), overruledon other grounds,Nielsen v. Adams,
388 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Neb. 1986); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974) (holding
seller could be liable for failure to disclose a known material fact); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d
885, 888 (W.Va. 1982) (finding duty to disclose latent defects); Green Spring Farms v. Spring
Green Farm Assocs. Ltd., 492 N.W.2d 392, 396-97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting caveat emptor
in favor of "more enlightened rule").
73. 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
74. Id at 204; accordAssilzadeh, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182; Shapiro v. Sutherland, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 101, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
75. See Assilzadeh, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182; Shapiro, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 107.
76. See Johnson,480 So. 2d at 629 (finding failure to disclose was fraudulent concealment);
Ben Farmer Realty Co. v. Woodard, 441 S.E.2d 421,423 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing passive
concealment as fraud); Mulkey v. Waggoner, 338 S.E.2d 755, 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing
passive concealment as fraud).
77. See Strawn v. Canuso, 657 A.2d 420, 431 (N.J. 1995) (finding a failure to disclose
existence of closed, nearby landfill containing hazardous waste actionable), called into doubt
Nobrega v. Edison Glen Assocs., 772 A.2d 368, 373 (N.J. 2001); cf Powell v. Wold, 362 S.E.2d
796, 799-800 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (holding, in an affirmative fraud case, real estate broker could
be liable for falling to disclose that a major thoroughfare extension was planned near the property).
78. See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lisenby, 579 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. 1991)
("Ordinarily, sellers of used residential property have no duty to disclose any defect[s] to a
purchaser."); Mitchell v. Skubiak, 618 N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) ("a seller's silence
in not disclosing defects, standing alone, does not give rise to a cause of action for
misrepresentation"); M & D, Inc. v. W.B. McConkey, 585 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
("It is not enough... that the seller had knowledge of the defect and failed to disclose it; rather,
the seller must make some type of misrepresentation."); Platzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502,504
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("New York adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and [generally]
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jurisdictions do require sellers to speak truthfully when they do speak and
impose liability for active concealment of known material defects, 79 but,
under this view, sellers generally are not liable for mere silence.8"
d. Disclosures Required by Statute
Most jurisdictions, by statute, now impose mandatory duties of
disclosure upon sellers."1 Some courts view their respective statutes as a
general abrogation of caveat emptor.82 The requirements of these statutes
vary: some require disclosures about specific areas; others are more
general. These statutes are discussed in more detail below.83 With the
adoption of statutes requiring mandatory disclosures, the law has imposed
greater duties on sellers and brokers and limited or eliminated the
application of caveat emptor.
e. Caveat Emptor's Continuing Viability
Notwithstanding the modem changes to property law imposing new
implied warranties, title covenants, duties to disclose, and statutory
disclosure requirements, caveat emptor continues to hold a place in many
real property transactions. Courts continue to speak the language of caveat
emptor and invoke its authority. As noted above, the doctrine is still
generally followed in sales of commercial real estate and commercial
leases.84 Many courts continue to apply the rule to patent or obvious

"); Copland
imposes no duty on the seller to disclose any information concerning the premises ....

v. Nathaniel, 624 N.Y.S.2d 514, 519-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (stating that generally caveat emptor
applies; silence alone is insufficient for fraud).
79. See, e.g., Kracl v. Loseke, 461 N.W.2d 67, 72 (Neb. 1990) (granting rescission where
seller sheetrocked to conceal termite damage); Van Deusen v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207, 210 (Va.
1994) (holding concealment of foundation cracks with new mortar and placement of materials in
front of cracks supported fraud claim); RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 160 cmt. b, illus.
1, 2 (1981) (concealing foundation cracks is misrepresentation).
80. There are exceptions to the general rule. For example, a seller may be liable for failure
to disclose conditions known to the seller that pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm, see
Conahanv. Fisher, 463 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Copland4 624 N.Y.S.2d at 521;
RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965), or where a special or fiduciary relationship exists
between the seller and buyer, see Commercial Credit Corp., 579 So. 2d at 1294.
81. See infra note 193.

82. See Parmely v. Hildebrand, 603 N.W.2d 713,716 (S.D. 1999) ("In South Dakota, 'caveat
emptor' is a doctrine of the past when it comes to transferring real property.").
83. See infra notes 193-236 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 69 & 71; see also Hearne v. Statesville Lodge No. 687, Loyal Order of
Moose, Inc., 546 S.E.2d 414, 415-1.7 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment for
defendant broker who allegedly represented that septic system would be adequate for new
restaurant, noting that plaintiffs failed to investigate and protect their own interest and that parties
were dealing at arm's length).
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defects, those that should have been known or were reasonably
discoverable by the purchaser.8 5 The Ohio Supreme Court, in Layman v.
Binns,86 stated that caveat emptor applies subject to the following
conditions: "(1) the defect must be open to observation or discoverable on
reasonable inspection, (2) the purchaser must have an unimpeded
opportunity to examine the property and (3) the vendor may not engage in
fraud.""7 In Layman, the sellers knew of a defective basement wall which
they attempted to remedy with steel beams.88 The court held that the
purchasers had no claim because the defective wall was open to
observation, and the purchasers had an unhindered opportunity to examine

it.89 Some courts generally hold that silence does not support a finding of
fraud. 90

f. Caveat Emptor and Real Estate Brokers
It followed that so long as the seller had no duty to disclose defects in
the property, the real estate broker, as an agent of the seller, had no duty
to disclose defects either.9 As sellers' common law duties increased,
however, real estate brokers' duties also increased, and courts even began
to impose duties of disclosure upon the real estate brokers, separate from,
or in addition to, duties of the seller. 92 These duties were justified, at least

85. See Conahan, 463 N.W.2d at 119 (holding caveat emptor applied, termite damage was
not concealed and should have been discovered by purchasers and their inspector); Mackintosh v.
Jack Matthews & Co., 855 P.2d 549, 553 (Nev. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs "are charged with all
knowledge that they actually had, as well as any knowledge that would have been discovered by
reasonable inquiry"); Copland, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 520-22 (holding caveat emptor defeated claim in
which the seller had no duty to disclose prior treatment for termites and use of chemical); Eiland
v. Coldwell Banker Hunter Realty, 702 N.E.2d 116, 123-24 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding no
liability for leaky basement when purchasers had opportunity to inspect and had knowledge of some
signs of problems).
86. 519 N.E.2d 642 (Ohio 1988).
87. Id. at 644.
88. Id.

89. Id. The dissent disagreed, arguing that the finder of fact could properly have "found that
the structural defect.., was not readily apparent upon reasonable inspection" by inexperienced
purchasers, and therefore, the sellers did have a duty to disclose the defect. Id. at 645 (Locher, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
90. See Williamson v. Realty Champion, 551 So. 2d 1000, 1001-02 (Ala. 1989) (holding that
caveat emptor applied in case with numerous defects); Ray v. Montgomery, 399 So. 2d 230, 233
(Ala. 1980) (holding no liability for termite damage and finding "no duty to disclose facts when
information is not requested, and mere silence does not constitute fraud").
91. See Kezer v. Mark Stimson Assocs., 742 A.2d 898, 903 (Me. 1999) ("By common law
sellers of real estate have no obligation to disclose property defects to buyers, and, as their agents,
real estate brokers have all of the defenses as their principals that arise out of the transaction.")
(citations omitted).
92. ComparePlatzman v. Morris, 724 N.Y.S.2d 502,504 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("New York
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in part, by the important role real estate brokers play, expectations and
reliance of real estate purchasers, and recognition of real estate brokers as
professionals possessing particular expertise and experience. Imposition
of duties came to reflect expectations of the marketplace.
Traditionally, a real estate broker, as agent of the seller, owed fiduciary
duties to the seller93 but owed no special duties to purchasers and actually
had duties not to disclose a seller's confidential information. The rule of
caveat emptor meant that generally real estate brokers were not liable to
purchasers for defects in the real estate.94 As courts in the past few decades
have moved away from caveat emptor, they have imposed liability upon
real estate brokers for failure to make disclosures under various tort
theories.
3. Affirmative Fraud as an Exception to Caveat Emptor
Even during its heyday, caveat emptor did not prevent liability for
affirmative fraud by a seller or broker." A broker, by virtue of his or her

adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and [generally] imposes no duty on the seller to disclose
any information concerning the premises .... "), with N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443(4) (McKinney
2001) (providing that "[i]n dealings with the buyer, a seller's agent should.., disclose all facts
known to the agent materially affecting the value or desirability of property").
93. These duties are the duties of loyalty, full disclosure, good faith, and due care. See
ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW § 262 (1987) (discussing broker's fiduciary
duties).
94. See Cashion v. Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 1977) (applying rule of caveat emptor
to broker); GAUDIO, supra note 93, § 292, at 345 (discussing caveat emptor's limitation on broker
liability); Ronald Benton Brown &Thomas H. Thurlow III, Buyers Beware: Statutes Shield Real
Estate BrokersandSellers Who DoNot Disclose That PropertiesAre PsychologicallyTainted 49
OKLA. L. REV. 625,625 (1996) (discussing caveat emptor's limitation on broker liability); Clarance
E. Hagglund et al., Caveat Misrepresenter:The Real EstateAgent's Liability to the Purchaser,5
HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 381, 381-82 (1993) (discussing caveat emptor's limitation on broker liability).
95. According to one 1910 treatise:
If in negotiating a contract in behalf of the principal the broker is guilty of fraud
as to the other contracting party, he is liable to him therefor in damages. If a
broker employed to sell property which is subject to incumbrances misrepresents
or conceals the fact that the property is incumbered, he is liable to the purchaser
in damages.
WALKER, supra note 4, § 315, at 215 (citations omitted); see alsoNATHAN T. FITCH, THE LAW OF
REAL ESTATE AGENCY; HAVING A GENERAL APPLIATION TO PRINCIPALS, AGENTS AND THIRD

PARTIES, AS DEDUCED FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS 67-75 (1881) (discussing liability of

real estate agents for misrepresentations); BROOM, supra note 18, at 184 (distinguishing, in
discussion of caveat emptor, cases of fraud; "where there is fraud, as in the case of wilful
misrepresentation ... the party guilty of that fraud is responsible to the party injured"). In David
v. Moore, 79 P. 415 (Or. 1905), the court explained:
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profession, is not relieved of the duties demanded generally of all
individuals, and brokers have been held liable for fraud (or related torts)
for affirmatively misrepresenting the property's size,96 location, 97
suitability for intended use," general condition,99 extent of termite
infestation,100 connection to city sewer, 0'° availability ofwater,' 2 freedom
from soil contamination,0 3 compliance with building code, 0 4 zoning
This rule [caveat emptor] does not apply, however, to a case where the seller of
real property makes representations in respect to matters of which the buyer has
no knowledge, and no means at hand ofobtaining knowledge. Where one assumes
to have knowledge of a subject of which another may be ignorant, and knowingly
makes false representations regarding it, ... the party who makes such statements
will not be heard to say that the person who took his word, and relied upon it, was
guilty of such negligence as to be precluded from recovering compensation for
injuries which were inflicted on him under cover of the falsehood.
Id. at 417 (citations omitted); see Pustelniak v. Vilimas, 185 N.E. 611, 612-14 (111. 1933) (setting
aside sale of business property based on fraudulent statements by seller and broker regarding
amount of sales and profits); Hoist v. Stewart, 37 N.E. 755, 756 (Mass. 1894) (holding plaintiff
purchaser could maintain fraud action against his own agent for misrepresenting running of nearby
trains); Roberts v. Holliday, 74 N.W. 1034, 1035-36 (S.D. 1898) (holding broker liable for false
representations concerning location of the property); Gunther v. Ullrich, 52 N.W. 88, 89-90 (Wis.
1892) (holding plaintiff purchaser entitled to damages against real estate agent for falsely
representing location of lots purchased); cf Thrams v. Block, 86 P.2d 938, 939 (N.M. 1938)
(affirming rescission of sale contract on the basis of fraudulent statements made by broker). For
examples of modem cases holding brokers liable for affirmative misrepresentations, see BURKE,
supra note 2, § 8.2.3 & nn.6-13 (citing fraud cases in various circumstances).
96. See Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 NE.2d 409, 413-14 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (misrepresenting lot size in multiple listing sheet); John v. Robbins, 764 F. Supp. 379,385-87
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (misrepresenting square footage in multiple listing entry); Reda v. Sincaban, 426
N.W.2d 100, 102-03 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (misrepresenting lot size).
97. See Tri-Prof I Realty, Inc. v. Hillenburg, 669 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(misrepresenting which property was for sale).
98. See Executive Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 557 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Ala. 1990) (misrepresenting
suitability of property for townhouse development could support fraud); Aiello v. Ed Saxe Real
Estate, Inc., 499 A.2d 282, 284 (Pa. 1985) (finding fraudulent statements regarding suitability of
soil for sewage system); Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 114-15 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992)
(misrepresenting suitability of property for use where subsurface water was contaminated).
99. See Clark v. Olson, 726 S.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Mo. 1987) (holding statement that house
was in good condition could support fraud claim where house had foundation cracks and frame
deformations).
100. See Godfrey v. Steinpress, 180 Cal. Rptr. 95,99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding statements
minimizing extent of termite damage and infestation supported fraud); Smith v. Renaut, 564 A.2d
188, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (misrepresenting extent of termite damage).
101. See Johnson v. Brado, 783 P.2d 92,93 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (misrepresenting that house
was connected to city sewer).
102. See Strout Realty, Inc. v. Burghoff, 718 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Ark. Ct. App. 1986)
(misrepresenting that good water was available).
103. See Sheehy v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 507 N.E.2d 781, 782 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (holding
at summary judgment stage that fact finder could find misrepresentation against broker in
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classification, °5 probability of rezoning, °6 the existence of appraisal at a
stated value,"0 7 the state interest in acquiring property,' the condition of
the property's title,'0 9 the experience and qualifications of the builder,"0
and that the deposit would be held in an escrow account."'
B. Liability Under Agency Theories
Among the earliest duties imposed on real estate brokers were those
derived from principles of agency law. Traditionally, real estate brokers
were agents of sellers." 2 Sometimes a purchaser would hire and pay a real
estate broker to find a property to purchase, but those occasions were
comparatively rare. Usually, when a potential purchaser contacted a real
estate broker to help find a property, the law considered the broker a
"subagent" of the listing broker; the listing broker was considered the
seller's agent."' The subagent was paid a commission from the sale by the
seller, not the purchaser.

connection with statements regarding hazardous materials on the property).
104. See Dyer v. Johnson, 757 P.2d 178, 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (misrepresenting
reconstruction in compliance with code).
105. See Barnes v. Lopez, 544 P.2d 694, 697 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that
misrepresentation regarding zoning classification supported finding of fraud); Leperav. Fuson, 613
N.E.2d 1060, 1066 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the misrepresentation that property could
be used as two-family dwelling supported claim of fraud where broker knew such use violated

zoning).
106. See Executive Dev., Inc. v. Smith, 557 So. 2d 1231,

1233-34 (Ala. 1990)

(misrepresenting probability of rezoning property could support fraud).
107. See Dyer, 757 P.2d at 180 (misrepresenting existence of written appraisal for $220,000).

108. See Storage Servs. v. Oosterbaan, 262 Cal. Rptr. 689, 693, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(misrepresenting that state had no interest in acquiring property).
109. Riehle v. Moore, 601 N.E.2d 365, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (misrepresenting existence
of clear title).
110. See Gennari v. WeichertCo. Realtors, 691 A.2d350, 364-66 (N.J. 1997) (misrepresenting
builder's experience and qualifications).
S111.See Harrison v. Gibson, 534 So. 2d 257, 259 (Ala. 1988) (misrepresenting nature of
account holding deposit).
112. See Snider v. State ex rel Okla. Real Estate Comm'n, 987 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Okla. 1999)
("In the traditional, historical relationship a real estate agent was the agent of the seller, and this
agency did not extend to the buyer... ."); BURKE, supranote 2, § 2.1, at 27 (stating the broker is
usually the vendor's agent).
113. See GAUDIO, supra note 93, § 218, at 284 (stating that the selling broker is considered
subagent of listing broker); BURKE, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 9 ('selling broker usually becomes the
subagent of the listing broker"). For a good discussion of agency and subagency relationships, see
Stortroen v. Beneficial Finance Co., 736 P.2d 391, 395401 (Colo. 1987) (discussing broker's
agency relationships and subagency). In this context, a real estate broker acting as a subagent is the
agent of both the appointing agent and the principal. IH. at 396; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 5 cmt. d (1958) (noting that subagent has fiduciary duties to both appointing agent
and principal).
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Real estate brokers, as agents, owe their principals fiduciary duties.
Their fiduciary duties include the duty of good faith and loyalty, the duty
of reasonable care, and the duty of disclosure.'" 4 In the words of one court,
The relationship between a real estate broker and a property
owner for whom the agent has by oral or written contract
agreed to sell the owner's property is that of principal and
agent. A real estate agent owes a fiduciary duty (1) to use
reasonable care, skill, and diligence in procuring the greatest
advantage to his client, and (2) to act honestly and in good
faith, making full disclosures to his client of all material facts
affecting his interests." 5
Many early real estate broker cases involved sellers bringing claims (or
defenses)" 6 against their agents for breach of the agent's fiduciary duties
by, for example, concealing or failing to communicate material
information to the seller." 7 In the typical situation, the agency theory was
not helpful to purchasersbecause brokers, as agents of the sellers, owed
no fiduciary duties to the purchasers.
This problem was compounded by the fact that until very recently,
purchasers did not understand that brokers were not working for them. In
an often-cited Federal Trade Commission survey published in 1983, the
data revealed that 72% of purchasers believed the "cooperating" broker'"
represented them and not the seller."' Since the 1983 survey, states have

114. See BURKE,supra note 2, § 4.2, at 193 (discussing fiduciary duties); GAUDIO, supranote
93, § 262, at 315-16 (discussing fiduciary duties).
115. Vogt v. Town & Country Realty, 231 N.W.2d 496, 501 (Neb. 1975).
116. Many of the early cases were brought by brokers seeking commissions, and sellers
responded with claims of breach of brokers' duties. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Baker, 12 Ky. L. Rptr.
93, 93 (Ky. Super. 1890); Martin v. Bliss, 10 N.Y.S. 886, 887 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1890).
117. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Jones, 101 Ind. 542,551 (Ind. 1885) (noting defendant real estate
agent's duty to communicate more advantageous offer to plaintiff, and holding defendant liable for
double-dealing and deceitful concealment); Edmonson, 12 Ky. L. Rptr. at 93 (noting agent's duty
to inform principal of pending negotiations and relieving principal from obligations of contract);
Martin, 10 N.Y.S. at 888 (affirming dismissal ofcomplaint by broker when broker attempted to talk
seller down on price without disclosing that full price was offered by purchaser).
118. The broker hired by the seller to list the property is typically called the "listing broker."
See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 22 (3d ed. 1999); see also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2079.13(f) (West 2001) (defining "listing agent"). The broker who is helping the purchaser locate
a property, is often referred to as the "cooperating broker" or "selling broker." See GEORGE
LEFCOE, supra, at 19; Joseph M. Grohman, A Reassessment of the Selling Real Estate Broker 's
Agency Relationship with the Purchaser,61 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 560, 560-61 (1987) (discussing
types of brokers); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.13(n) (West 2001) (defining "selling agent").
119. FTC STAFFREPORT, supranote 12, at 69 (1983). Significantly, 82% ofresponding sellers
also believed that cooperating broker was working for the purchaser. Id. at 67.
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addressed this problem by legislation mandating agency disclosures1 20 or
by redefining agency relationships.12 A large majority of states now
122
require written disclosure of a real estate broker's agency relationship.
The industry also responded by changing its practices 123 to allow
cooperating agents to separately represent purchasers.
Agency disclosure requirements are helpful but limited. They may
encourage greater care by purchasers and less reliance on sellers' brokers,
but agency disclosures do not encourage greater disclosure about the
property itself. Changes to agency laws, adopted by some states, however,
have provided more protections and potential remedies for purchasers.
These new agency laws permit representation of the purchaser directly by
the cooperating or selling agent 24 or allow dual representation of both the
seller and purchaser. 25 Many statutes redefine agency duties for real estate
brokers and impose upon all brokers duties to both purchasers and

120. See Snider v. State ex rel Okla. Real Estate Comm'n, 987 P.2d 1204, 1209 (Okla. 1999)
(noting government survey and response by real estate commission requiring agency disclosure).
121. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.396 (Michie 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-808
(2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325d (2001); D.C. CODEANN. § 42-1703 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 475.278 (West2001); IOWACODE§ 543B.55 (2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13273 (West
2001); MD. CODEANN. BUS. OCC.&PROF. § 17-530 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.2517
(West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.197 (West 2001); MO. REV. STAT. § 339.770 (2001); MONT.
CODEANN. § 37-51-314 (2001); N.M. STAT.ANN. § 61-29-10.2 (Michie 2001); N.Y.REAL PROP.
LAW § 443 (Consol. 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.57 (Anderson 2001); OKLA. STAT. tit.
59, § 858-355 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 696.820 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-20.6-3 (2001). For
a comprehensive list of jurisdictions with citations, see Katherine A. Pancak et al., Real Estate
Agency Reform: Meeting the Needs ofBuyers,Sellers, andBrokers,25 REAL ESTATE L.J. 345, 37377 (1997) (Table 1).
122. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.17 (West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278 (West.
2001); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 454/15-35 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.2517
(West Supp. 2001); N.Y. REALPROP. LAW § 443 (Consol. 2001); OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 4735.57
(Anderson 2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 6573a (15c) (Vernon 2002).
123. One authority explained the change initiated by theNAR: "MTheNAR recommended that
subagency no longer be a condition for MLS participation. The formerly mandatory offer of
subagency was replaced with a listing broker's offer of 'cooperation and compensation' to
cooperating brokers." Pancak et al., supra note 121, at 352 (footnote omitted). The NAR reported
in a 1993 survey that 65% of home buyers "either had knowledge or were informed of agency
representation by the first contact with the agent with whom they were working." Id. at 353.
124. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.740 (2001) (discussing duties of buyer's agents); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.53(A) (West 2002) (identifying agency relationships); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-57-137(A) (Law. Co-op. 2001) (listing acceptable agency relationships); S.D. CODIFIED LAW
§ 36-21A-131 (Michie 2001) (listing agency relationships).
125. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.88.396(c) (Michie 2001) (broker may act as agent for both);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.197 (West 2001) (requiring disclosure of dual agency, broker owes a
fiduciary duty to both seller and buyer); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.53(A)(3) (West 2002)
(permitting dual agency); OR. REV. STAT. § 696.815(1) (1999) (stating that real estate licensee may
represent both seller and buyer).
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sellers. 2 6 In a typical statute, a seller's broker continues to have fiduciary
duties to the seller, but also has specified duties to the buyer, such as the
duty to deal fairly and the duty to disclose known material defects.l2 7 Some
statutes permit a broker to enter a non-agency relationship with the parties
and impose statutory duties owed to all parties. 2 ' Violations of these
duties, imposed by statute, are the basis for revocation of licenses' 29 and
may be the basis for civil action by the injured party. 30
C. Modern Expansion of Broker Liability
Today, brokers find themselves liable to purchasers of defective
properties under several theories: fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, innocent misrepresentation, and specific statutory provisions.
Claims for fraud are not limited to those grounds long accepted under the
common law-affirmative misrepresentations and concealed facts; they
now extend to material omissions.

126. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-27-84 (2001) (identifying duties owed to all parties in real
estate transaction); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 339.730, 339.740 (2001) (designating seller's and buyer's
agents as limited agents and imposing duty to disclose known adverse material facts); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 76-2417(3), 76-2418(1) (3)(a) (2001) (designating seller's and buyer's agents as limited
agents and imposing duty to disclose known adverse material facts); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 696.805,
696.810 (1999) (identifying duties of brokers to both seller and buyer).
127. E.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CoDE R4-28-1 101(A), (B) (2000) (stating licensee owes a fiduciary
duty to client, "shall also deal fairly with all other parties to a transaction," and has duty to disclose
material defects); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 454/15-25(a) (West 2001) (imposing duty of
disclosure to purchaser upon seller's broker); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 13273, 13274 (West
2002) (imposing duties to buyer on seller's agent, and to seller on buyer's agent); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 443(4) (Consol. 2001) (imposing duties of reasonable care, good faith, and disclosure of
known material facts on seller's agent in dealings with buyer).
128. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-802(6) (2001) (defining"transaction-broker"); id. § 12-61807 (stating that transaction-broker is not agent for either party and outlining duties); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 475.278(2)(a) (West 2001) (authorizing and discussing duties of transaction broker); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-30,113 (2000) (stating that a transaction broker is not agent for either party and
discussing duties); Mo. REV. STAT. § 339.710(20) (2002) (defining transaction broker); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 36-21A-144 (Michie 2001) (discussing duties of a transaction broker).
129. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-27-88 (2001) (stating a violation actionable by Alabama Real
Estate Commission); ARK. CoDEANN. § 17-42-312(Michie 2001) (stating violations actionable by
commission); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-61-811 (2001) (stating violations actionable by commission);
OR. REV. STAT. § 696.301 (1999) (identifying grounds for discipline).
130. Cf. e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-27-34(a)(2) (2001) (imposing duties to any injured party); id
§ 34-27-87 (stating statute supersedes common law if inconsistent); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32,
§ 13276 (West 2002) (referring to injured party's cause of action under statute); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 339.840 (2001) (statute supersedes common law of agency, but does not limit civil actions for
negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, or breach of contract); Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 979 P.2d
534, 536 & n.l (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (applying duty of fair dealing in administrative code to
misrepresentation claims in purchaser's civil action).
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1. Expansion of Fraud Liability to Include Omissions
The tort of fraud, also known as misrepresentation or deceit, requires
an intentional misrepresentation of material fact.' Brokers and sellers,
particularly in earlier cases, argued with some success that mere silence
was not a misrepresentation.' Under this theory, neither a broker nor a
seller committed fraud by remaining silent or failing to disclose known
facts. As one noted authority observed, under this rule "the owner of a
dwelling which he knows to be riddled with termites can unload it with
impunity upon a buyer unaware, and go on his way rejoicing."'33
The law, however, has increasingly allowed recovery in the face of
otherwise fraudulent omissions through a series of broad and everexpanding "exceptions" which permit a finding of fraud where a party had
a duty to speak but failed to do so. Courts today recognize fraud based on
nondisclosure, sometimes referred to as "fraud by silence."' 4 Fraud based
on nondisclosure is recognized in cases involving partial disclosures ("if
the defendant does speak, he must disclose enough to prevent his words
from being misleading");' 35 when the parties have a confidential or
fiduciary relationship;' "when the circumstances are such that the failure
to disclose something would violate a standard requiring conformity to
what the ordinary ethical person would have disclosed;"
when a

131, The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a complete statement of the rule:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law
for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance
upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
132. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 481, at 1375 (2000) (stating traditional rule "that
the bargainer is not ordinarily obliged to make affirmative revelations of known material facts").
133. PROSSER &KEETON ONTHELAw OF TORTS § 106, 738 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafterPROSSER&KEETON];see also Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 42 N.E.2d
808, 808-09 (Mass. 1942) (holding seller not liable for failure to disclose termite infestation).
134. See Mahler v. Keenan Real Estate, Inc., 876 P.2d 609, 611 (Kan. 1994) (referring to
claim of "fraud by silence"); France v. Chaprell Jeep-Eagle Dodge, Inc., 968 P.2d 844, 846 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1998) (referring to claim of "fraud by silence"); DOBBS, supra note 132, § 481, at 1375
(referring to "fraud by silence").
135. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(b) (1977); PROSSER&KEETON, supra note
133, § 106, at 738-39.
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977); PROSSER& KEETON, supra
note 133, § 106, at 738.
137. See PROSSER&KEETON,supra note 133, § 106, at 739; of RESTATEMENT(SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(e) (1977).
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previous representation is subsequently discovered to be untrue or
misleading; 38 and when statutes impose a duty.'39
The exceptions are of particular relevance to real estate brokers in the
context of residential real estate sales. Hence, if the purchaser asks about
termites and the broker answers, or if the broker volunteers information
about termite damage, the broker has a duty to disclose the full extent of
the damage.141 Quite clearly, if the broker is the purchaser's agent, the
broker, as a result of his or her fiduciary duties, has a duty to disclose
material facts. 141 Even if the broker is the seller's agent, the broker in most
states nonetheless has either a statutory or common law duty to disclose
known material facts.142 Today, the seller or the broker who knowingly
sells the termite-infested house without disclosing to the purchaser may
leave rejoicing, but the rejoicing ends when the complaint is served.
2. Negligence and Broker Malpractice Theory
The law has not stopped at expanding broker liability under a fraud
theory. It has also imposed tort liability for misstatements or omissions
under a negligence 143 or malpractice theory.'" Several courts have
138. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 551(2)(c) (1977).
139. DOBBS, supra note 132, § 481, at 1375.
140. See Roberts v. C & S Sovran Credit Corp., 621 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Ala. 1993) (noting
if agent is questioned directly about defect, agent has duty to disclose); Fennell Realty Co. v.
Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Ala. 1988) (holding broker liable for failing to disclose heating and
air conditioning unit problem after purchaser's direct inquiry); Lock v. Schreppler, 426 A.2d 856,
862 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981) ("Once [real estate agent] undertook to inform plaintiffs of the termite
problem, he had a duty to fully inform the plaintiffs so as not to mislead them with inadequate
information.").
141. See Bazal v. Rhines, 600N.W.2d 327, 329 (IowaCt. App. 1999) (noting, in case brought
by vendor against purchaser's agent,broker's duty to disclose existence of restrictive covenant to
purchasers); cf Van Deusen v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207,211 (Va. 1994) (dismissing fraud claim, but
sustaining a negligence claim and holding purchaser's real estate agents had a duty to disclose
known structural defects).
142. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409,413-14 (111. App.
Ct. 1986) (holding brokers had duty to speak regarding known material information; brokers owe
duty of good faith to purchasers even absent agency relationship); Bazal, 600 N.W.2d at 329
(finding duty to disclose material facts to buyers and sellers supported by NAR Code of Ethics);
Gross v. Sussex Inc., 630 A.2d 1156, 1169-70 (Md. 1993) (finding that law places duty of good
faith and fair dealing on broker in favor of all parties with whom broker deals); see also infra note
167 and accompanying text.
143. See,'e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383,392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming
judgment against broker on negligence claim); Gerard v. Peterson, 448 N.W.2d 699,702 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1989) (finding broker liable for negligence); Binette v. Dyer Library Ass'n, 688 A.2d 898,
904 (Me. 1996) (allowing plaintiffs to amend negligent misrepresentation claim against broker to
allege negligence claim).
144. A cause of action for broker malpractice or professional negligence is another way of
characterizing a claim for broker negligence. Malpractice, also referred to as professional
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recognized the tort of negligent misrepresentation in the broker context.1 45
For example, in Cechovic v. Hardin & Associates, Inc., 46 the Montana
Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for purchasers against a real estate
agent and real estate broker for negligently misrepresenting property
boundaries. 47 In Gerardv. Peterson,141 the Iowa Court of Appeals held a
real estate broker was negligent when he advised purchasers that a clause
making their purchase contingent upon receiving financing was not
necessary.149 In Newbern v. Mansbach 5 the Florida District Court of
Appeals, held that a real estate broker could be found negligent for
misrepresenting to the purchaser that the property was not located in a
Coastal Barrier Resource Area.' 5 '

negligence, is a type of negligence involving a standard of care based on the skill used in the
particular profession and perhaps some different evidential requirements. The cases speak in terms
of broker malpractice, professional negligence, and broker negligence. See Haldiman v. Gosnell
Dev. Corp., 748 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (characterizing claim against broker as
claim for "real estate malpractice"); Lakeside, Inc. v. DeMetz, 621 N.E.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1993) (discussing appropriate statute of limitations for real estate broker malpractice); Menzel
v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 471 (Iowa 1985) (discussing plaintiffs broker negligence claim as
malpractice); May v. ERA Landmark Real Estate, 15 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Mont. 2000) (discussing
professional negligence claim against broker and holding expert testimony required to establish
standard of care).
145. See, e.g., John v. Robbins, 764 F. Supp. 379, 387 (M.D.N.C. 1991) (denying defendant
broker's motion for summary judgment on negligent misrepresentation claim); Lombardo v. Albu,
14 P.3d 288,290-91 (Ariz. 2000) (holding broker as agent is liable for negligent misrepresentation
to third parties); Messlerv. Phillips, 867 P.2d 128, 132 (Colo. CL App. 1993) (affirming judgment
against broker on claim for negligent misrepresentation); Newbem v. Mansbach, 777 So. 2d 1044,
1045 (Fla. Ist DCA 2001) (reversing summaryjudgment for broker on negligent misrepresentation
claim); ZIMMERMAN, 510 N.E.2d at 414-15 (finding complaint alleged claim for negligent
misrepresentation against broker); Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (La. Ct. App. 1982)
(affirming judgment against broker on negligent misrepresentation claim); Gross, 630 A.2d at
1170-71 (allowing negligent misrepresentation claim); Cechovic v. Hardin & Assocs., Inc., 902
P.2d 520,522-23 (Mont. 1995) (affirming jury verdict for purchaser on negligent misrepresentation
claim); Provost v. Miller, 473 A.2d 1162,1164 (Vt. 1984) (remanding negligent misrepresentation
claim for a new trial with proper instructions).
Not all courts recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation. See S. County, Inc. v. First W.
Loan Co., 871 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Ark. 1994) (refusing to recognize tort of negligent
misrepresentation); cf Trytko v. Hubbell, Inc., 28 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating, after
discussing conflicting Indiana cases, that "courts have been divided as to whether Indiana
recognizes the tort of negligent misrepresentation"); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 895
P.2d 1195, 1203 (Idaho 1995) (limiting tort of negligent misrepresentation to claims involving
accountants).
146. 902 P.2d 520 (Mont. 1995).
147. Id. at 522-23.
148. 448 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989).
149. Id. at 702-03.
150. 777 So. 2d 1044 (Fla. Ist DCA 2001).
151. Ia at 1046-47.
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The tort of negligent misrepresentation is set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Torts:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability
for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance
upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care
or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information." 2
A real estate broker is one who in the course of his or her business supplies
information for the guidance of others.153 The Restatement requires that the
broker "supply false information," but many courts, though not all, allow
negligent misrepresentation by omission.'54 In Binette v. Dyer Library
Ass'n,1 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that ajury could find
a real estate broker negligent for failing to disclose the existence of a 3,000
gallon underground oil tank on the property sold to plaintiffs.' 56 In
Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc.,' the Appellate Court of
Illinois reinstated a negligence claim where the broker allegedly failed to
disclose a known flooding problem and accurate lot size.'58

152.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
153. Zimmerman v. Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding "[r]ealtors are in the business of supplying such information").
154. See Matthews v. Kincaid, 746 P.2d 470, 471 (Alaska 1987) (stating that negligent
misrepresentation requires a misrepresentation or omission of a fact); Alaface v. Nat'l Inv. Co., 892
P.2d 1375, 1387 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) ("Negligent misrepresentation may be by omission or
nondisclosure of material facts .... "); Binette v. Dyer Library Ass'n, 688 A.2d 898,903 (Me. 1996)
(holding failure to disclose may constitute supplying false information to support negligent
misrepresentation claim). But see Burman v. Richmond Homes Ltd., 821 P.2d 913, 919 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1991) (stating that failure to make disclosure, not supplying false information, does not
support claim of negligent misrepresentation); Arnona v. Smith, 749 So. 2d 63, 66 (Miss. 1999)
(stating that negligent misrepresentation requires a misrepresentation or omission of a fact); Martin
v. Ohio State Univ. Found., 742 N.E.2d 1198, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ("A negligent
misrepresentation claim does not lie for omissions: there must be an affirmative false statement.");
Hagans v. Woodruff, 830 S.W.2d 732, 736 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that defendant must
provide false information, and refusing to impose duty to investigate and disclose); Richey v.
Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo. 1995) (rejecting theory of negligent misrepresentation based on
nondisclosure of information, but finding potential liability under separate nondisclosure theory).
155. 688 A.2d 898 (Me. 1996).
156. Id. at905.
157. 510 N.E.2d 409 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987).
158. Id. at 415. The broker had listed the property with an inaccurate lot size. Id. at 413-14.
That allegation alleged an affirmative misrepresentation. Id. at 414.
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Several courts have addressed claims against brokers using a
malpractice theory,'59 and commentators have argued in favor of a
malpractice approach. 60 These negligence-based claims, whether labeled
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, or malpractice, have at their core
the basic elements of negligence: duty, breach, cause in fact, legal cause,
and damages. The duty may be articulated in different ways: the duty of
care exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the same or
similar circumstances, 161 or the duty to exercise the skill and knowledge
normally possessed by real estate brokers in good standing. 62 Indeed, the
duty differs depending upon the nature of the parties involved; as noted
above, the broker owes his principal fiduciary duties, greater duties than
he owes to other parties to the transaction or the public generally. The
standard of care is defined in part by industry practice, 163 industry

159. See, e.g., Haldiman v. Gosnell Dev. Corp., 748 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)
(characterizing claim against broker as claim for "real estate malpractice"); Lakeside, Inc. v.
DeMetz, 621 N.E.2d 1149, 1150-51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (discussing appropriate statute of
limitations for real estate broker malpractice); Menzel v. Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465,471 (Iowa 1985)
(discussing plaintiff's broker negligence claim as malpractice); May v. ERA Landmark Real Estate,
15 P.3d 1179, 1188 (Mont. 2000) (discussing professional negligence claim against broker); Hulse
v. First Am. Title Co., 33 P.3d 122, 140 (Wyo. 2001) (reaffirming existence of professional
negligence claim against licensed real estate professionals). But cf Tylle v. Zoucha, 412 N.W.2d
438,441 (Neb. 1987) (holding that real estate brokerage was not profession and therefore claim not
governed by statute of limitations for professional malpractice).
160. See GAUDIO, supra note 93, § 305, at 369 (stating that "[t]he time seems to be ripe, and
courts have begun, to deal with brokers under the doctrine of malpractice" and discussing benefits
of this approach).
161. See Tri-Prof I Realty, Inc. v. Hillenburg, 669 N.E.2d 1064, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(imposing on real estate broker duty "to use reasonable care"); Binette v. Dyer Library Ass'n, 688
A.2d 398, 903 (Me. 1996) (characterizing broker's standard as "reasonable care"); Hoffman v.
Connall, 736 P.2d 242, 243 (Wash. 1987) ("real estate broker is held to a standard of reasonable
care").
162. See Menzel, 362 N.W.2d at 471 (stating standard of conduct); Gerard v. Peterson, 448
N.W.2d 699, 703 (IowaCt. App. 1989) (citingMenzel); RESTATEMaEN(SECOND)OFTORTS § 299A
(1965) (stating standard of conduct for professionals). Some courts have emphasized the "high
standards" owed to the public by real estate brokers. See, e.g., Johnson v. Geer Real Estate Co., 720
P.2d 660, 666 (Kan. 1986); McCarty v. Lincoln Green, Inc., 620 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Mont. 1980);
Kelly v. Roussalis, 776 P.2d 1016, 1018-19 (Wyo. 1989).
163. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating
that duty supported by fact that "many brokers customarily impose [the duty] upon themselves as
an ethical matter").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 54

standards, 6 4 state statutes and regulations,"6 5 and duties imposed by
common law.'66

A large majority of jurisdictions, either by statute or common law,
impose a duty upon brokers to disclose known material defects in the
property.'67 A few courts have gone further and impose upon the listing
broker a duty to inspect the property listed for sale and to disclose material
defects that the broker should have discovered in such an inspection.
68 is the leading case to impose such duty.
Easton v. Strassburger'
Easton
held:
In sum, we hold that the duty of a real estate broker,
representing the seller, to disclose facts . , . includes the
affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent and
diligent inspection of the residential property listed for sale
164. See, e.g., id. at 389-90 (citing NAR Code of Ethics); Menzel, 362 N.W.2d at 472-73
(relying on Realtor's Code of Ethics found in Real Estate Manual).
165. See, e.g., Lombardo v. Albu, 14 P.3d 288, 291-92 (Ariz. 2000) (finding real estate
department regulation provided standard of conduct); Geer Real Estate Co., 720 P.2d at 665
(finding that broker licensing statute established duty to disclose).
166. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d I110, 1116-19 (N.J. 1993)
(discussing and imposing broker's duties to injured open-house visitor).
167. See, e.g., Williams v. Wells & Bennett Realtors, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, 37 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997) (holding broker has a duty to disclose known material facts); Cooper v. Jevne, 128 Cal. Rptr.
724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding broker has duty to disclose known material facts);
Baumgarten v. Coppage, 15 P.3d 304, 307 (Colo. Ct, App. 2000) (citing statute and discussing
broker's duty to disclose adverse material facts actually known by broker); Zimmerman v.
Northfield Real Estate, Inc., 510 N.E.2d 409,413-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding brokers had duty
to speak regarding known material information); Bazal v, Rhines, 600 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1999) (finding duty to disclose material facts); Binette v. Dyer Library Ass'n, 688 A.2d 898,
905 (Me. 1996) (citing regulations and stating that broker has duty to disclose known material
defects); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 317 A.2d 68, 74 (N.J. 1974) (noting rule that broker is liable for
nondisclosure of defects known to him but unknown to buyer); Stebbins v. Wells, 766 A.2d 369,
373 (R.I. 2001) (holding broker had duty to disclose known deficient conditions); Teter v. Old
Colony Co., 441 S.E.2d 728, 734-35 (W. Va. 1994) (agreeing that broker may be liable for failure
to disclose known material defects); ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE R4-28-110 1(A), (B) (2001) (stating
licensee has duty to disclose material defects); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278(4)(a) (West 2001)
(discussing a duty to disclose to buyer all known material facts not readily observable); GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-6A-5(b) (2001) (discussing a duty to disclose known adverse material facts); 225 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 454/15-25 (a) (West 2002) (imposing duty of disclosure to purchaser upon
seller's broker); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-10-10(d) (West 2001) (stating seller's broker must
disclose to buyer adverse material facts); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2417(3)(a), 76-2418(3)(a) (2001)
(stating that it must be disclosed in writing known, adverse, material facts); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 645.252(1)(a) (West 2002) (discussing a duty to disclose any material facts which agent knows
or should have known); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443(4) (Consol. 2002) (imposing duty of
disclosure of known material facts); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 452.133(l)(c) (West 2002) (imposing duty
to "[d]isclose to each party all material adverse facts that the broker knows and that the [other]
party does not know").
168. 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially
affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an
investigation would reveal.'69
The California legislature, at the behest of real estate broker professional
organizations,170 responded to Easton by codifying but limiting the duty to
inspect. 17 Although somejurisdictions have cited Eastonwith approval or
imposed a duty to inspect," most jurisdictions do not impose a duty to
inspect.173
Easton is an example of broker liability in a negligent
misrepresentation by omission case.' 4 Negligent misrepresentation is
significant because it eliminates the need to prove the intent required to
succeed in a fraud claim.'7 ' At a minimum, a broker may be liable even if
the broker had no intention to deceive and even if the broker had no actual
knowledge of the defective condition. Thus, in Easton, the California

169. Id. at 390 (footnote omitted).
170. See Robinson v. Grossman, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that
legislature responded to Easton at the urging of the California Association of Realtors).
171. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079-2079.6 (West 2002) (defining broker's duty to inspect);
id.§ 2079.12 (stating that intent of statute was "to codify and make precise the holding of Easton");
see also Robinson, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 383-84 (discussing Easton and § 2079).
172. See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § RL 24.07 (2001) (imposing duty to inspect); Gouveia v.
Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262,266 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) ("[A] broker may
have a duty to disclose defects that an inspection would reveal."); Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790,
795 n. I (Utah 1986) (citing, in dicta, Easton'sholding with approval); Conell v. Coldwell Banker
Premier Real Estate, Inc., 512 N.W.2d 239,242 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (noting and discussing duty
to inspect); Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106,113 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that statute imposes
duty to investigate).
173. See IND. CODEANN. §25-34.1-10-10(d) (Michie 2001) (providing no duty to inspect for
buyer); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,106 (2001) (providing seller's agent has no duty to inspect);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-51-313 (2001) (providing licensee has no duty to inspect); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 18.86.030(2) (West 2002) ("[A] licensee owes no duty to conduct an independent
inspection of the property .... "); Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 979 P.2d 534, 536 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that broker's duty to deal fairly does not include duty to investigate to discover
defects); Harkala v. Wildwood Realty, Inc., 558 N.E.2d 195, 200 (IU.App. Ct. 1990) (finding no
duty to investigate for hidden or latent defects); Steptoe v. True, 38 S.W.3d 213, 219 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (holding no duty to inspect); Kubinsky v. Van Zandt Realtors, 811 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting Easton and finding no duty to inspect); Teter v. Old Colony Co., 441
S.E.2d 728, 736 (W.Va. 1994) (declining to find duty to inspect to uncover latent defects).
174. See generally Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
175. See, e.g., Gross v. Sussex Inc., 630 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Md. 1993) (noting critical
difference between fraud and negligent misrepresentation is intent requirement); cf Van Deusen
v. Snead, 441 S.E.2d 207, 211 (Va. 1994) (sustaining demurrer on fraud counts, but reversing

judgment sustaining demurrer on negligence count where no intent alleged). A negligent
misrepresentation claim may also differ from a fraud claim in the application of comparative
negligence to a negligent misrepresentation claim. See Newbern v. Mansbach, 777 So. 2d 1044,
1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
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Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict finding a real estate broker
negligent for failing to disclose to the purchaser that there were potential
problems with the soil stability. v6 The broker was liable for failure to
disclose defects because he should have discovered them through
reasonable diligence even if the broker had no actual knowledge of the soil
problems. 'V
Another case approving liability for negligent failure to disclose is Van
Deusen v. Snead.'78 In Van Deusen, the Virginia Supreme Court held that
a purchaser's real estate agent was not liable to the purchaser for fraud
where there was no allegation of intent to mislead.'79 The real estate agent
could be liable, however, under a negligence theory for failure to disclose
a negative inspection report and a differential settlement problem. 8
3. Liability for Innocent Misrepresentations
A few courts have imposed strict liability in some circumstances for
even innocent misrepresentations, those representations that were neither
fraudulently nor negligently made, but which nonetheless were false. 8 In
a leading case, Bevins v. Ballard,"2 the Alaska Supreme Court found a
broker liable to purchasers for innocently misrepresenting that an existing
well on the property would provide an adequate water supply.'8 3 The
broker, in supplying the information, had relied upon information supplied
by the seller.'84 The court held that a broker may be liable where the broker
serves as a conduit for the owner's misrepresentations.' 85 The dissent in
Bevins objected to making "the broker the 'insurer' of the seller's
representation[s]" and argued that the broker should not have had a duty
to independently verify information supplied by the seller unless the agent
had reason to believe the information was false.8 6 The majority in Bevins

176. Easton, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
177. Id. at 387-90 (holding that "it need not be alleged or proved that the broker had actual
knowledge of the material facts in issue").
178. 441 S.E.2d 207 (Va. 1994).
179. Id. at211.
180. Id.
181. See, e.g., Clarance E. Hagglund et al., CaveatMisrepresenter:The Real Estate Agent's
Liability to the Purchaser,5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 381, 394-96 (1993) (discussing innocent
misrepresentation theory); Linda S. Whitton, Note, RealtorLiabilityforInnocentMisrepresentation
and UndiscoveredDefects: Balancingthe EquitiesBetween Broker andBuyer, 20 VAL. U. L. REV.
255, 255-71 (1986) (discussing innocent misrepresentation theory).
182. 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982), supersededby statute recognized in Amyot v. Luchini, 932
P.2d 244, 247 (Alaska 1997).
183. Id. at 763.
184. Id. at 759.
185. Id. at 762-63.
186. Id. at 763 (Connor, J., dissenting).
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won the battle, but the dissenters won the war. Bevins has been superseded
by a statute negating real estate 8 agent
liability for innocent
7
misrepresentation in real estate transfers.
Some courts have followed this distinct minority view finding liability
for innocent misrepresentations in the real estate broker context.' 88 Some
of these decisions have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement) in support of liability for innocent misrepresentations.8 9
The Restatement directly addresses liability of sellers, but expressly leaves

open the question ofwhether a misrepresentation by a broker should result
in liability. 90 Some cases cited in support of liability for innocent
misrepresentations are ambiguous because their facts and reasoning could
equally support a finding of negligence. 9 ' Significantly, a number of

courts has rejected innocent misrepresentation liability for brokers."

187. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.230 (Michie 2000) (stating that agents in real property
transfers are not liable for innocent misrepresentation); Amyot, 932 P.2d at 247 (addressing claim
against seller and holding disclosure statute "precludes claims of innocent misrepresentation as to
residential property concerning conditions included in the mandatory disclosure form").
188. See Spargnapani v. Wright 110 A.2d 82, 83-84 (D.C. 1954) (holding broker liable for
misstatement regarding heating system even if made in good faith); Berryman v, Riegert, 175
N.W.2d 438, 441-42 (Minn. 1970) (holding broker's representations that lot was dry and had no
water problems "fraudulent" even in the absence of intent to deceive or knowledge of falsity);
Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 672 A.2d 1190, 1205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding
broker liable under Consumer Fraud Act for misrepresentations about builder's reputation without
any knowledge or intent requirement); Gauerke v. Rozga, 332 N.W.2d 804, 805 (Wis. 1983)
(holding broker strictly responsible for misstatements regarding acreage, amount of road, and river
frontage); Redav. Sincaban, 426 N.W.2d 100,102-03 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (holding broker strictly
responsible for misrepresenting lot size; negligence is irrelevant).
189. Section 552C (1) states:
One who, in a sale, rental or exchange transaction with another, makes a
misrepresentation of a material fact for the purpose of inducing the other to act or
to refrain from acting in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other for
pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the
misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently or negligently.
§ 552C(l) (1977).
190. See id.§ 552C(l) cmt g (noting that agents have been held liable in a few cases, but that
the law is still developing).
191. See Sodal v. French, 531 P.2d 972, 973 (Colo. Ct App. 1974) (holding agent liable for
false statement regarding adequacy of water supply when that agent spoke without knowing the
truth or falsity of the statement); Pumphrey v. Quillen, 135 N.E.2d 328, 329-32 (Ohio 1956)
(holding false statements by broker indicating house was of "tile construction" supported fraud
claim where broker made the statement as fact knowing he did not have sufficient information to
justify the statement).
192. See Robinson v. Grossman, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
broker had no duty to verify sellers' statements); Lyons v. Christ Episcopal Church, 389 N.E.2d
623, 625 (III. Ct. App. 1979) (holding no claim when broker falsely represented house was
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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III. STATUTORY EFFORTS TO LIMIT BROKER LIABILITY

A. ResidentialPropertyDisclosure Acts
1. Seller's Disclosure Obligations
Statutes requiring seller disclosures, now existing in more than half the
states,193 are part of an effort to encourage greater disclosure to purchasers
early in the transaction with the hoped-for result of more equitably
negotiated agreements and more satisfied parties (and hence fewer
controversies). Many of these statutes were introduced and supported by
real estate brokers concerned about their own potential liability to
purchasers.' 94 The real estate industry viewed these statutes as means to
limit the liability of real estate brokers by imposing affirmative disclosure
requirements upon sellers and limiting brokers' duties to investigate or
disclose.
These statutes are sometimes referred to as "Residential Property
Disclosure Acts" or by similar names.' 95 Their disclosure requirements
connected to city sewer when broker merely passed on seller's information); Nordstrom v. Miller,
605 P.2d 545, 550-51 (Kan. 1980) (holding broker not liable for false representations that land was
irrigated where statements were made in good faith based on information from seller); Lopata v.
Miller, 712 A.2d 24, 32-33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (rejecting strict liability for broker's
innocent, affirmative misrepresentations regarding lot size); Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 564-65
(Pa. 1999) (rejecting tort liability for innocent misrepresentation made by broker concerning septic
tank test); Hoffman v. Connall, 736 P.2d 242, 246 (Wash. 1987) (holding real estate broker not
liable for innocent misrepresentations).
193. See Katherine A. Pancak et al., Residential Disclosure Laws: The FurtherDemise of

Caveat Emptor, 24 REAL EsT. L.J. 291, 298-99 (1996) (reporting that a little more than half the
states have enacted mandatory seller disclosure legislation). For examples ofsuch statutes, see, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102-1102.17 (West 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-327b (West 2001);
DEL. CODEANN. tit. 6, §§ 2570-2578 (2001); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1-77/99 (West 2001);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 89-1-501 to 89-1-523 (2001); NED. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,120 (Michie
2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47E-4 (2000); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.465-.490 (1999); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 66-5-201 to 66-5-210 (West 2001); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (Vernon 2002); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-519 (Michie 2001).
194. See James D. Lawlor, Seller Beware: Burden of DisclosingDefects Shifting to Sellers,

78 A.B.A. J. 90, 90 (1992) (noting that NAR "spearhead[ed] a drive for mandatory seller
disclosure," and noting pressure from state associations of real estate brokers as well); Pancak et
al., supra note 193, at 310 ("Statutory seller disclosure legislation is largely the result of the real
estate brokerage community's attempt to limit the expansion of a broker's duty to the buyer to
inspect and disclose."); Robert M. Washburn, Residential Real Estate Condition Disclosure

Legislation,44 DEPAUL L. REV. 381,436 (1995) (stating thatNAR"has been the primary impetus
behind the passage of the Prevailing Disclosure Act").
195. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1 (West 2001) (Residential Real Property Disclosure Act);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §47E (2000) (Residential Property Disclosure Act); TENN. CoDEANN. §66-5-210
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vary, but they typically only apply to specified sales of residential
property. 9 6 Some statutes exclude residential sales not involving an agent
or broker 197 or sales of new residential properties.'98 Some allow sellers to
make a general disclaimer rather than provide the disclosure statement,'99
or they permit purchasers to waive the right to the disclosure.2"'
The extent of the required disclosure varies. Often the statutes are quite
specific about the areas that must be disclosed and the level of detail
required. Several states, either in the statute itselfor by regulation, provide
the actual disclosure form that must be used by sellers.20' For example, the

(2001) (Tennessee Residential Property Disclosure Act); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-517 (Michie 2001)
(see title to Chapter 27, Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act); cf.765 DEL. CODEANN. tit.
6, §§ 2570-2578 (2001) (Buyer Property Protection Act).
196. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102 (West 2001) (stating that it applies to real property with
one to four dwelling units on it); id. § 1102.2 (stating that the statute is not applicable to certain
specified transfers of real property); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/5 (West 2001) (defining
"residential real property"); id § 77/10 (stating that the statute applies only to residential real
property); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(a) (Vernon 2002) (stating that it is applicable only to
residential real property comprising not more than one dwelling unit). But see N.H. REV. STAT.

ANN. § 477:4-c (2000) (imposing limited disclosures applicable to any property containing a
building).
197. See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 324.360 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (applying to sales involving
real estate licensee who receives compensation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-501 (2001) (applying
only to sales involving real estate broker or salesperson); OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 832(2) (2000)
(providing that disclosure statement only required if seller is represented by broker or if requested
by purchaser).
198. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMIP. STAT. ANN. 77/15(9) (West 2001) (stating that it is not
applicable to newly constructed residential real property); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(e)(10)
(Vernon 2002) (stating that it is not applicable to new residences).
199. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(b)(1) (2001) (requiring disclosure
statement or disclaimer statement); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.465(b)(2) (1999) (requiring disclosure
statement or disclaimer statement); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-202 (2001) (requiring disclosure
statement ordisclaimer statement); VA. CODEANN. §55-519 (Michie 2001) (requiring disclosure
statement or disclaimer statement).
200. See, e.g., NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 113.130(3) (Michie 2001) (stating that a purchaser may
waive in writing the right to receive disclosure); Wis. STAT. § 709.08 (2001) (stating that a buyer
may waive in writing the right to receive disclosure).
201. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 1102.6 (Deering 2001) (providing disclosure form in statute);
765 ILL. COMNP. STAT. ANN. 77/35 (West 2001) (providing disclosure form in statute); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 89-1-509 (2001) (providing disclosure form in statute); OR. REv. STAT. § 105.465 (1999)
(providing disclosure form in statute); TENN. CODEANN. § 66-5-210 (2001) (providing disclosure
form in statute); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(b) (Vernon 2002) (providing disclosure form in
statute); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-327b(d)(1) (West 2001) (requiring Commission of
Consumer Protection to create a form); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2578 (2001) (requiring real estate
commission to develop a standard form); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47E-4(b) (2000) (requiring real estate
commission to develop a standard disclosure statement); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-519 (Michie 2001)
(requiring real estate board to provide form); Pancak et al., supra note 193, at 321-32 (reproducing
in appendix Connecticut disclosure form promulgated by regulations and Washington's disclosure
form).
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Illinois disclosure report form requires disclosure of: known problems with
flooding, leaks in the basement, foundation cracks, leaks in the roof or
ceilings, drinking water, radon, asbestos, lead paint, lead pipes, lead in the
soil, subsidence, settlement, earth stability, termites or other wood boring
insects; known defects in the walls, floors, electrical system, plumbing,
well, heating system, air conditioning, fireplace, septic or sanitary sewer
system; existence of underground fuel storage tanks, boundary disputes;
the fact of location in flood plain; and receipt of notices of violation of law
2
relating to the property. 02
The Maine statute is an example of a statute that is both specific and
general. It requires specific disclosures concerning private water supply,
insulation, private waste disposal systems, and hazardous materials, but in
sweeping and general language requires disclosure of "[a]ny known
defects."2 3 An example of a more general disclosure requirement is the
Hawaii statute which defines the required disclosure statement as:
[A] written statement prepared by the seller or at the seller's
direction, that purports to fully and accurately disclose all
material facts relating to the residential real property being
offered for sale that:
(1) are within the knowledge or control of the seller;
(2) can be observed from visible, accessible areas; or
(3) are required to be disclosed under section 508D-1 5204
Some statutes mandate disclosures in only a few narrow areas.

5

202. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/35 (West 2001).
203. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 173 (West 2001). The Maine requirements can be very
specific. For example, concerning water supply, the statute requires:
[T]he seller of residential real property shall provide to the purchaser a property
disclosure statement containing the following information:
1. WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM. The type of system used to supply water to
the property. If the property has a private water supply, the seller shall disclose:
A. The type of system;
B. The location of the system;
C. Any malfunctions of the system;
D. The date of the most recent water test, if any; and
E.Whether the seller has experienced a problem such as an unsatisfactory
water test or a water test with notations ....
Id.
204. HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508D-1 (Michie 2001).
205. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-3-606(2) (2001) (requiring seller to disclose any radon
testing); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:4-c (2000) (requiring disclosures concerning water supply
and sewage system).
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Although the statutes impose duties upon sellers, they also provide
protection to sellers. Under some statutes, the seller is only required to
reveal known problems or answer in good faith,2 7 and the seller may not
be obligated "to make any specific investigation or inquiry in an effort to
complete the disclosure statement."2 8 Usually the statutes or the disclosure
forms explicitly state that the disclosure statement is not a warranty by the
seller and "is not a substitute for inspections either by the individual
purchasers or by a professional home inspector."20 9 Significantly, the
statutes usually also impose a short statute of limitations.2 0
Failure to make the required disclosures may give the purchasers the
option to rescind the sales contract without penalty. 21' The purchaser may
sue for damages based on intentionally false
statements made in the
212
disclosure or failure to provide disclosures.

206. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/25(a), (b) (West 2001) (providing that a seller
is not liable if the seller had no knowledge of an inaccuracy in the report; duty to disclose if seller
has actual knowledge); VA. CODEANN. § 55-521 (Michie 2001) (providing that a seller is not liable
if the seller had no knowledge of an inaccuracy in the report; duty to disclose if seller has actual
knowledge); Wis. STAT. § 709.07 (2001) (providing that a seller is not liable if the seller had no
knowledge of an inaccuracy in the report); cf NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,120(5) (Michie 2001)
(requiring that notice be completed to the best of seller's belief and knowledge; if information is
unknown, seller should indicate that fact); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(d) (Vernon 2001)
(requiring that notice be completed to best of the seller's belief and knowledge; if information is
unknown, seller should indicate that fact).
207. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.7 (Deering 2001) (providing that disclosures must be made in
good faith); TENN. CODEANN. § 66-5-201 (2001) (providing that disclosures must be made in good
faith); Wis. STAT. § 709.06 (2001) (providing that disclosures must be made in good faith).
208. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/25(c) (West 2001); accordVA. CoDEANN. § 55-519(a)(2)
(Michie 2001).
209. TENN. CODEANN. § 66-5-201 (2001); see also, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (Deering
2001) (providing that a disclosure statement is neither a warranty of any kind nor a substitute for
inspections or warranties); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,120(3)(e)-(f) (Michie 2001) (providing
that a disclosure statement is neither a warranty nor a substitute for inspection or warranty); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 113.140(2) (Michie 2001) (stating that a completed disclosure form is not a
warranty); TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008 (Vernon 2002) (stating that a completed disclosure form
is not a substitute for inspections or warranties); Wis. STAT. § 709.03 (2001) (stating that a
completed disclosure form is not a warranty of any kind, and not a substitute for inspection).
210. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508D-17 (Michie 2001) (providing a two year
limitation); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/60 (West 2001) (providing a one year limitation); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 113.150(4) (2001) (providing a limitation of the later of one year from discovery
or two years from conveyance); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(c) (Michie 2001) (providing a one year
limitation).
211. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/55 (West 2001) (providing right to terminate
contract); VA. CODEANN. §§ 55-520(B), 55-524(B)(2) (Michie2001) (providing right to terminate
contract).
212. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.13 (Deering 2001) (providing for damages); 765 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/55 (West 2001) (providing for damages and attorney's fees); NEB. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 76-2,120(1 1) (Michie 2001) (providing for damages and attorney's fees); NEv. REv.
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2. Impact of Disclosure Acts on Brokers' Duties
Statutes imposing mandatory seller disclosures both directly and
indirectly impact broker duties and liability. Many of the statutes expand
broker liability but only in narrowly defined ways. Often they impose a
duty upon the broker to inform the seller and the buyer about their
respective duties and rights under the statute. 2 3 Also, they may require the
broker to verify receipt ofthe disclosure statement by the buyer.214 At least
one statute requires that the broker make disclosures regarding condition
of the property on the same disclosure form with the seller.215 These
additional burdens on a broker are modest in comparison to the limitations
on broker liability that the statutes afford.
Many statutes expressly provide that the disclosures are made by the
seller and not by the seller's agents. 2 6 The clear purpose of these
provisions is to limit brokers' liability for misstatements made by sellers
in the disclosure statement. To establish fraud, a plaintiff must show that
the defendant made a misstatement or had a duty to speak but failed to do
so. 21 If statements in the disclosure statement are made by the seller, not
the broker, then any misstatements in the disclosure statement are not the
broker's misstatements.21 8 Some statutes are even more explicit; they
provide that the seller's agent is not liable for any errors, inaccuracies, or
omissions in the disclosure statement unless the agent has knowledge of
the error, inaccuracy, or omission.219

STAT. ANN. § 113.150(4) (Michie 2001) (allowing treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees for
known undisclosed defects); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(B)(1) (Michie 2001) (providing for
damages). For illustrative cases, see Woods v. Pence, 708 N.E.2d 563, 564-65 (Ill. Ct. App. 1999)
(providing that the plaintiff stated claim against seller who falsely stated in disclosure statement
that there were no water leakage problems); Bohm v. DMA Partnership,607 N.W.2d 212, 215
(Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (providing that the purchaser stated a claim against seller for failure to
provide disclosure statement disclosing known water damage).
213. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-523 (Michie 2001) (creating duty to inform owners and
purchasers of rights and obligations under statute).
214. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.12 (Deering 2001); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508D-7(b)
(Michie 2001).
215. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1102.6 (Deering 2001).
216. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,120(3)(i) (Michie 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 555 10(A)(2) (Michie 2001); cf TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(b) (Vernon 2002) (providing that a
seller's disclosure "is not a warranty of any kind by ... seller's agents").
217. See Robert M. Washburn, ResidentialReal Estate ConditionDisclosureLegislation,44
DEPAuL L. REv. 381, 387-88 (1995).
218. See id.
219. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2,120(9) (Michie 2001); see also TENN. CODEANN.
§ 66-5-206 (2001) (providing licensee not liable except for intentional fraud or failure to "disclose
adverse facts of which licensee has actual knowledge or notice"); VA. CODEANN. § 55-523 (Michie
2001) (providing licensee not liable for violations under this chapter or failure to disclose any
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A broker generally has a duty to disclose any misstatements in the
disclosure statement that the broker has knowledge of. This requirement
may be express or implied in the statute?20 or may be rooted in the broker's
professional duty to disclose known adverse material facts. 22 The statutes
also often expressly allow the seller's agent to "reveal the completed form
and its contents to any purchaser or potential purchaser of the residential
property."t m
Some jurisdictions provide similar protection to brokers in real estate
broker licensing or related provisions. Alabama's Real Estate Consumer's
Agency and Disclosure Act, for example, provides that:
A licensee shall not be liable for providing false information
to a party in a real estate transaction if the false information
was provided to the licensee by a client of the licensee or by
knows
a customer or by another licensee unless the licensee 223
or should have known that the information was false.
The mandatory seller disclosures benefit brokers indirectly too. They
document disclosures that were made to the buyers and may forestall
contrived or imagined claims that conditions were not disclosed. They may
also prevent unhappy purchasers from successfully claiming reasonable
reliance on a broker's representations where those representations were
contrary to the seller's disclosures. In Buchanan v. Geneva Chervenic
affirmed summary judgment for a
Realty,'24 the Ohio Court of Appeals
225
defendant real estate company. The plaintiffhome purchaser alleged that
information regarding the real property).
220. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508D-7(c) (Michie 2001) ("If the seller's agent is or
becomes aware of any material facts inconsistent with or contradictory to the disclosure statement
or the inspection report of a third party provided by the seller, the seller's agent shall disclose these
facts to the seller, the buyer, and their agents."); Bohm v. DMA P'ship, 607 N.W.2d 212,220 (Neb.
Ct. App. 2000) (holding no claim against agent unless agent knew seller made knowing
misrepresentations on disclosure statement).
221. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (noting duty of disclosure imposed on
brokers).
222. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 113.120 (Michie 2001); see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 762,120(3)(h) (Michie 2001).
223. ALA. CODE § 34-27-86(b) (2001); accord,e.g., D.C. CODEANN. § 42-1703(a)(2) (2001)
(providing that seller's agent not liable to buyer for unknowingly providing false information if
information was provided by seller); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13273(2)(A) (West 2001)
(providing that seller's agent not liable to buyer for unknowingly providing false information that
was provided by seller); Robinson v. Grossman, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380, 385 (Ct. App. 1997)
(construing Cal. Civil Code § 2079, finding no duty for broker to independently verify or disclaim
the accuracy of seller's representations); cf IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.1-10-10(d) (Michie 2001)
(providing that there is no duty to verify accuracy of statements made by seller).
224. 685 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
225. Id. at 266.
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the real estate agent failed to disclose and made misleading statements
about a water problem in the basement and pet damage.226 The court found
that the water problem was not a latent defect, and the real estate company
had no duty to disclose when the buyer had notice of water problems from
the seller's disclosure form.227 Moreover, accepting allegations of the
agent's false and misleading statements as true, the court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant because there could be no justifiable
of information, home inspection
reliance in view of the seller's disclosure
22 1
inspections.
own
plaintiff's
and
report,
B. Limiting Liabilityfor Nondisclosureof Psychologically
Impacted Properties
State legislatures also have been active in limiting sellers' and brokers'
duties to disclose certain types of facts. A majority ofjurisdictions 229 have
adopted some type of "shield" law addressing sales of psychologically
impacted property.230 Psychologically impacted properties may include
properties whose occupants were infected with AIDS, were murdered,
committed suicide, or were victims of crime. 231 Section 55-524 of the
Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act, is an example and provides
as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter or any
other statute or regulation, no cause of action shall arise
against an owner or a real estate licensee for failure to
disclose that an occupant ofthe subject real property, whether
or not such real property is subject to this chapter, was
afflicted with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) or that
the real property was the site of:
1. An act or occurrence which had no effect on the
physical structure of the real property, its physical
environment, or the improvements located thereon; or
2. A homicide, felony, or suicide.232

226. Id. at 267.
227. Id. at 268.
228. Id. at 270.
229. See Ronald Benton Brown & Thomas H. Thurlow III, Buyers Beware: Statutes Shield
RealEstateBrokersandSellers Who DoNot Disclose ThatPropertiesAre PsychologicallyTainted,
49 OKLA. L. REv. 625, 628-44 (1996) (citing twenty-nine states with such laws).
230. See id.
231. Paula C. Murray,AIDS, Ghosts,Murder:Must Real EstateBrokers andSellersDisclose?,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 689 (1992).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(A) (Michie 2001); accord,e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-207
(2001).
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Some statutes expressly include deaths on the property by natural causes
as covered psychological impact.3 These shield statutes usually protect
real estate brokers as well as sellers,234 although a few address only broker
liability without addressing seller liability. 5
The law governing real estate broker liability progressed from limited
liability theories based on caveat emptor and agency principles to
expansive liability based in some cases on even innocent
misrepresentations. In the last two decades, statutes increasingly have
defined real estate brokers' duties and liabilities. In some cases these
statutes have halted or even retreated from evolving common law theories
expanding broker liability. Disputes involving brokers now require review
of mandatory disclosure acts, professional licensing statutes (including
related regulations), other real property statutes, and local common law.
IV. CONTRACTUAL EFFORTS TO LIMT BROKER LIABILITY:
THE "As Is" CLAUSE

A. ContractualEfforts to Limit Liability
Real estate brokers have turned to contract law to limit their increasing
risk of liability. 36 These provisions may appear in the real estate purchase
agreement, as a separate document at or prior to closing, or in other
233. The Texas provision is an example of a statute that includes death by natural causes. It
states:
A seller or seller's agent shall have no duty to make a disclosure or release
information related to whether a death by natural causes, suicide, or accident
unrelated to the condition of the property occurred on the property or whether a
previous occupant had, may have had, has, or may have AIDS, HIV related
illnesses, or HIV infection.
TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(c) (Vernon 2002); see also N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443-a(1)
(Consol. 2001) (providing that occupant with HIV or property which was the "site of a homicide,
suicide, or other death by accidental or natural causes," or any felony, does not constitute a material
defect).
234. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-524(A) (Michie 2001) ("[N]o cause of action shall arise
against an owner or a real estate licensee for failure to disclose .... ."); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 5.008(c) (Vernon 2002) ("A seller or seller's agent shall have no duty to make a disclosure.. ").
235. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 454115-20 (West 2001) ("No cause of action shall arise
against a licensee for the failure to disclose....").
236. Sellers, who are usually codefendants with brokers, have also sought refuge behind the
"as is" clause. See Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, ConstructionandEffect ofProvisionin Contract
for Sale of Realty by Which PurchaserAgrees to Take PropertyAs Is or in Its Existing Condition,
8 ALR 5th 312 (1992) (discussing and gathering cases involving the "as is" clause). This Article
focuses on the effectiveness of the "as is" clause to protect brokers, although some of the same
considerations are applicable to sellers.
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collateral documents.237 Brokers use various types of provisions to limit
their liability: the "as is" clause, a non-reliance clause, a release or waiver
clause, and a merger or integration clause. Regardless of the form they
take, the provisions share the same basic objective-to place the risk of
any defects in the quality of the property upon the purchaser.
The "as is" clause states that the buyer takes the property "as is," in its
current condition.23 The import of the "as is" clause is that the purchasers
get what they paid for and nothing less; the purchasers accept the risk and
are on notice that there might be defects in the condition of the property.
In short, the brokers, who provide these form contracts, and their sellers,
are saying: "Attention purchasers, we have no responsibility for the
condition of the property, and you can't sue us when you later decide that
the property is not perfect." Some provisions add waiver and release
language to the "as is" provision. For example, one such clause stated:
"Furthermore, it is understood that I/we are accepting the property in 'as
is' condition and realize that in so doing I/we waive any rights to object or
claim against the seller or his agent regarding the condition of the
premises.' 23 9 Many contracts also contain language boldly proclaiming

237. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-519 (Michie 2001) (providing for residential property
disclaimer statement in form promulgated by Real Estate Board); Choung v. lemma, 708 N.E.2d
7, 9-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (involving a purchase agreement and later land contract); Brooks v.
Holmes, 413 N.W.2d 688, 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (involving a closing agreement); Crase v.
Hahn, 754 So. 2d 471,472-74 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (involving a purchase agreement, disclosure
statement, and property inspection letter); Bando v. Achenbaum, 651 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996) (involving a sale contract); Dawson v. Tindell, 733 P.2d 407, 409 (Okla. 1987)
(involving a closing release).
238. For examples of contract language with "as is" provision, see CommercialCreditCorp.
v. Lisenby, 579 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. 1991) (involving a document that stated that purchasers
had "inspected the property and accept it in its present condition"); Assilzadeh v. CaliforniaFederal
Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 180 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Subject property is being sold in its present 'As
Is' condition."); Choung, 708 N.E.2d at 10 ("This property purchased in AS IN NOW
CONDITION .... "); Hamtil v. J.C. Nichols Real Estate,22 Kan. App. 2d 809, 811 (Kan. Ct. App.
1996) ("Subject to any inspections allowed under my contract... I agree to purchase the property
in its present condition only, without warranties or guarantees of any kind by seller or any realtor
concerning the condition or value of the property.") (original in uppercase); Crase, 754 So. 2d at
473 ("The property is being purchased 'as is' and 'where is'... ."); Atkins v. Kirkpatrick,823
S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ("This property is purchased 'as is' and neither Seller nor
agent nor Broker(s) makes or implies any warranties as to the condition ofthe premises."); Fletcher
v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) ("they accept[ed] the property in its 'AS IS'
conditions [sic]") (alteration in original); Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992) ("Buyer is buying the property in a[n] as is condition without any warranties.").
239. Crase, 754 So. 2d at 474 (involving language in signed property inspection letter)
(original in uppercase); see also,e.g., Dawson,733 P.2d at 409 ("[The purchasers waive all claims,
rights and demands against the sellers to repair, replace or remedy any defects and release sellers,
[realtors], their agents, employees, representatives, sub-agents, and co-brokers from any liability
whatsoever."); Fletcher,26 S.W.3d at 75 (stating "[p]urchasers release and hold [brokers] harmless
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non-reliance by the purchaser on the broker's representations. An example
of this type of provision states: "Purchaser is not relying upon any
representations of the Seller or Seller's agents or sub-agents as to any
condition which Purchaser deems to be material to Purchaser's decision
to purchase this property."24 Perhaps even more specific are "independent
investigation" clauses:
The Purchaser agrees and represents that said Purchaser has
conducted an independent investigation and inspection of said

land and premises, and has entered into this Contract in full
reliance thereon, and that there are no other agreements,
verbal or otherwise, modifying or affecting the terms hereof,
and that Purchaser is not relying on oral representations made
by Seller or Seller's agent. 4 '
Many contracts combine aspects of these various provisions. A New York
form sales contract, for example, includes an "as is" provision, non-

reliance provision, and independent investigations provision.242 Efforts to

from any and all liability in regard to [any warranties or representations]").
240. Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079,1083 (Wyo. 1999); see also Reeves v. Porter, 521
So. 2d 963; 966 (Ala. 1988) (stating that purchaser "agrees that neither the Seller nor any real estate
agents involved in this transaction have made any representations ...upon which he, or she, has
relied"); Ben Farmer Realty Co, v. Woodward, 441 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
("Purchaser acknowledges that [she] has not relied upon the advice or representations, if any, by
Broker (or agents of Broker) relating to ... the structural condition of the property ....")
(alterations and omission in original); Hamtil, 923 P.2d at 515 ( "I state that no important
representations concerning the condition of the property are being relied upon by me except as
disclosed above or as fully set forth as follows ....
"); Bowman v. Meadow Ridge, Inc., 615 A.2d
755, 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) ("In entering into this Agreement, Buyer has not relied upon any
representation, claim, advertising, promotional activity, brochure or plan of any kind made by
Seller or Seller's agents of employees unless expressly incorporated or stated in this Agreement.");
Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., 8 P.3d 324, 332 (Wyo. 2000) (involving issues similar

to Snyder).
241. Parkhill v. Fuselier, 632 P.2d 1132, 1134 (Mont. 1981).
242. See 14 POWELL, supra note 60, at App 81D-9. The residential sales contract, prepared
by various bar associations and others, states:
12. Condition of Property. Purchaser acknowledges and represents that Purchaser
is fully aware of the physical condition and state of repair of the Premises and of
all other property included in this sale, based on Purchaser's own inspection and
investigation thereof, and that Purchaser is entering into this contract based solely
upon such inspection and investigation and not upon any information, data,
statements or representations, written or oral, as to the physical condition, state of
repair, use, cost of operation or any other matter related to the Premises or the
other property included in the sale, given or made by Seller or its representatives,
and shall accept the same "as is" in their present condition and state of repair....
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limit liability may also rely upon the integration or merger clause on the
theory that representations or commitments, not included in the contract,
are not part of the agreement.243
B. Effect of the "As Is" andRelated Clauses
Notwithstanding these seemingly clear and broad provisions, courts
have construed them narrowly and limited their application. The effect of
these provisions turns on the nature of the claim alleged and the
knowledge and situation of the purchaser. A purchaser has a number of
possible claims against a broker: intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, innocent misrepresentation, negligence/malpractice,
breach of fiduciary duties, or violation of specific statutory requirements.
Courts, almost to the point of unanimity, agree that these contractual
provisions do not preclude claims for intentional misrepresentation.244 The

Id.
243. See, e.g., Reeves v. Porter, 521 So. 2d 963, 966 (Ala. 1988) ("This contract states the
entire agreement between the parties and merges in this agreement all statements, representations,
and conditions heretofore made, and any other agreements not incorporated herein are void and of
no force and effect."); Bowman, 615 A.2d at 757 ("This is the entire Agreement between the
parties, and there are no other terms, obligations, covenants, representations, statements or
conditions, oral or otherwise, of any kind whatsoever which are not herein referred to or
incorporated.").
244. See, e.g., Wilson v. Century 21 Great W. Realty, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779,782 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) ("'As is' language in a realty sales contract does not shield a seller or his agent from liability
for affirmative or... negative fraud."); Rayner v. Wise Realty Co., 504 So. 2d 1361, 1364 (Fla.
1st DCA 1987) (holding "as is" provision does not bar a claim for fraudulent nondisclosure);
Sheehy v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 507 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (stating "as is" clause
is not an automatic defense to fraud); Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Neb.
1994) (holding "as is" and merger clauses do not relieve real estate agent from responsibility for
fraudulent representations); MacKintosh v. Jack Matthew & Co., 855 P.2d 549,551-52 (Nev. 1993)
(stating "as is" clause does not shield one who makes affirmative false representations); Gouveia
v. Citicorp Person-To-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc., 686 P.2d 262, 268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
broker could be liable for alleged misrepresentation that property was in "all top shape" even
though agreement contained "as is" clause); Dygert v. Leonard, 525 N.Y.S.2d 436,438 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988) (finding "as is" and merger clauses are not shields from claims of fraud in the
inducement of the contract); Black v. Cosentino, 689 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(reaffirming that "'as is' clause cannot be relied upon to bar a claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation or fraudulent concealment"); Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000) ("such an agreement will not bind a buyer who is induced to enter the agreement
because of fraudulent representation"); Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852, 862 (Vt. 1991) (stating
clause does not as a matter of law defeat fraud claim); Snyder, 992 P.2d at 1085 (stating merger
clause does not preclude fraud claim); see also Leatherwood, Inc. v. Baker, 619 So. 2d 1273, 1276
(Ala. 1992) (Homsby, C.J., dissenting) (noting that large majority of states hold that "as is"
provision does not insulate vendor from liability for fraud and listing cases). But see id. at 1275
(reversing jury verdict and holding no fraud or negligence liability in part because of "as is"
clause).
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impact of these provisions on negligent misrepresentation, innocent
misrepresentation, and negligence claims is less clear, but many courts
hold that these claims also survive.245 Some courts limit the reach of such
clauses to contractual warranty claims246 or to representations concerning
condition of the property, not including size or other characteristics.247
Some courts limit the effect of"as is" clauses to visible or obvious defects
and exclude concealed or latent conditions.24 Courts also have disregarded
general disclaimers in cases of dangerous defects known to the broker.249
A few courts have refused to extend contractual protections to a broker
based on the real estate sales contract where the broker was not a party to
the contract, 250 but most courts permit the broker to claim the benefits of
such provisions.25 '
245. See Limoge v. People's Trust Co., 719 A.2d 888, 891 (Vt. 1998) (holding "as is" clause
does not defeat negligent misrepresentation claim); Silva, 589 A.2d at 862 (stating that "as is"
clause does not exclude tort liability including negligence and strict liability claims); Grube v.
Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 117-18 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding neither misrepresentation nor
negligence cases barred by "as is" clause); cf Dygert, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 438 (allowing plaintiff to
allege innocent misrepresentation and mutual mistake even though contract contained "as is" and
"merger" clauses).
246. See Silva, 589 A.2d at 862 (stating "as is" language means no implied warranties and
does not address tort liability at all); Grube, 496 N.W.2d at 116-17 (implying that the clause is
limited to the warranty context); see alsoPrudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d
156, 166 (Tex. 1995) (Comyn, J., concurring) (arguing that "as is" clause automatically bars only
implied warranties).
247. Draisner v. Scholsberg, 57 A.2d 202, 203 (D.C. 1948) (holding that "as is" clause
"referred only to the state of repairs of the property" and "had nothing to do with the number of
rooms in the house"); Zoda v. Eckert, Inc., 674 P.2d 195, 199 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (finding
clause that stated purchasers "accept said property in regardsto condition... as is" applied only
to condition and not lot size of the property or existence of heat pump).
248. See Katz v. Dept. of Real Estate, 158 Cal. Rptr. 766,769 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (providing
that "as is" provision does not protect against liability for passive concealment); Lingsch v. Savage,
29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 209 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (holding "as is" provision means "buyer takes the
property in the condition visible to or observable by him," but does not reach facts not within the
buyer's reach); Mulkey v. Waggoner, 338 S.E.2d 755,757 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "as is"
clause applies to obvious or reasonably discernable defects, not those that could not be detected by
observation).
249. See Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1004-06 (Ala. 1988) (holding agent
had duty to disclose dangerous condition of furnace notwithstanding "as is" clause).
250. See Rodgers v. Johnson, 557 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (holding broker and
agents who were not parties to sales contract were not protected by the exculpatory provision);
Menking v. Larson, 199 N.W. 823,825 (Neb. 1924) (referring to anon-reliance clause and holding
that the agent could not "shield himself from his wrongdoing by such a clause in the contract of his
principal"); Wittenberg v. Robinov, 173 N.E.2d 868, 869 (N.Y. 1961) (holding broker, as nonparty
to contract, was not entitled to the benefits of a disclaimer in the sales contract).
251. See Bowman v. Meadow Ridge, Inc., 615 A.2d 755, 757-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(permitting defense based on integration clause even though the broker was not a party to the sales
agreement); Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 76 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the agent
of a party to "as is" agreement could assert the agreement as defense); cf Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc.,
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Although the impact of the "as is" clause is limited and somewhat
unpredictable, these clauses are relevant and determinative in many
cases.252 "As is" or other exculpatory clauses in many cases prevent
reasonable reliance by the purchaser,253 a necessary element of a
misrepresentation claim and potentially relevant to causation in a
negligence claim.254 The "as is" clause may also defeat tort claims based
on non-disclosure,25 contract claims,25 6 and negligence claims.257 An

express release may bar all claims.258

979 P.2d 534, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (finding release provisions ineffective as non-negotiated
terms and seeing "no reason why the nature of the exculpatory clauses should vary depending upon
whether [defendants] are parties or third party beneficiaries"). Contracts may also attempt to make
a broker a party to the real estate purchase contract. See THERON R. NELSON & THOMAS A. POTTEP,
REAL ESTATE LAW: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 337-38 (1994) (reproducing sample purchase
contract with provision stating, "The broker(s) named herein, join(s) in this agreement and
become(s) a party hereto ....
").
252. See, e.g., Conahan v. Fisher, 463 N.W.2d 118, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) ("Generally,
the buyer bears the risk of loss under an 'as is' contract unless the seller fails to disclose concealed
defects known to him.").
253. See, e.g., Haygood v. Burl Pounders Realty, Inc., 571 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Ala. 1990)
(holding that it was not possible to rely on the representations made by the broker in view of "as
is" statement and "no reliance" clause); Assilzadeh v. Cal. Fed. Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176, 187
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that purchaser's knowledge, including understanding that unit was
sold "as is," prevented reasonable reliance on broker's opinion); Ben Farmer Realty Co. v.
Woodard, 441 S.E.2d 421,424 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding the broker not liable for concealment
where the purchaser knew she was buying the house in "as is 'condition and knew of major defects;
she failed to exercise due diligence); Bando v. Achenbaum, 651 N.Y.S.2d 74,76 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (holding clause disclaiming reliance inconsistent with fraudulent misrepresentation claim);
Bowman, 615 A.2d at 758 (holding integration and no reliance clause destroys allegations of
reliance); Sundown, Inc. v. Pearson Real Estate Co., 8 P.3d 324, 332 (Wyo. 2000) (holding
"nonreliance" clause defeated claim for negligent misrepresentation); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992
P.2d 1079, 1089 (Wyo. 1999) (holding "nonreliance" clause defeated claim for negligent
misrepresentation).
254. See Pennington v. Braxley, 480 S.E.2d 357, 360 (Ga. Ct.App. 1997) (holding reliance
necessary to prove proximate cause in malpractice claim); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs.,
Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 161 (Tex. 1995) (involving seller's liability, holding "as is" agreement
negates the causation element essential to a negligence claim); Fletcher,26 S.W.3d at 75 (holding
"as is" agreement negates the causation element essential to a negligence claim).
255. See Choung v. Iemma, 708 N.E.2d 7, 15 (Ind.Ct. App. 1999) (holding that "as is" clause
and waiver negated any duty to disclose the fact that the house was relocated to a new foundation);
Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 117 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (suggesting "as is" clause may protect
agent from claims premised on nondisclosure).
256. See Crase v. Hahn, 754 So. 2d 471, 473-75 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (holding neither seller
nor brokers liable for breach of contract, express warranty, or negligence where purchaser signed
contract, disclosure statement, and inspection letter, each containing "as is" provision).
257. See id. at 475 (finding no liability under negligence claim).
258. See Brooks v. Holmes, 413 N.W.2d 688,689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding an express
release barred fraud, misrepresentation, and negligence claims against real estate broker and agent).
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Even courts which limit the effect of an "as is" or related clause
generally hold that the clause is evidence of whether a purchaser in fact
reasonably relied upon a broker misrepresentation or omission.259 Thus, if
purchasers sign a contract stating that they have not relied upon any
representations of the broker, the clause, as a matter of law, may not bar
a misrepresentation claim, but it is some evidence that in fact the
purchasers did not rely.26 At bottom, as a review of the published cases
demonstrates, plaintiffs' victories against real estate brokers are relatively
infrequent, and often exculpatory clauses play some part in the outcome.
C. The Problem With "As Is" Provisions
"As is" and similar provisions pose a problem for residential real estate
purchasers. Purchasers do not insert "as is" or non-reliance provisions in
the contract, brokers do. Purchasers often do not carefully review their real
estate purchase agreements or do not possess the understanding necessary
to ascertain the impact of such provisions. Consider the family who is
relocating to a new city and makes a house hunting trip. The purchasers
may have a few days to investigate the area, locate suitable houses, agree
on a particular house, and settle on a price. With luck, by the fourth or fifth
day of the trip, the purchasers find a suitable property and make a signed
offer. The seller may immediately accept the offer or reject it: If the offer
is rejected, there may follow a day or two of negotiation followed by an
agreement.26 ' The exhausted and exasperated. purchasers who sign the
agreement want nothing more than to get out of town, secure in the
knowledge that they will not be living on the streets when they return with
their household goods and family.

259. See Cruse v. Coldwell Banker/Graben Real Estate, Inc., 667 So. 2d 714,717 (Ala. 1995)
(holding that "as is" agreement created ajury question as to whether purchasers reasonably relied
upon misrepresentation); Sheehy v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 507 N.E.2d 781, 784 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987)
(agreeing that exculpatory clauses may have evidential value on the questions of representations
made and reliance); Gibb v. Citicorp Mortgages, Inc., 518 N.W.2d 910,918 (Neb. 1994) (holding
"as is" relevant in determining reliance, but not controlling); PrudentialIns. Co., 896 S.W.2d at
166-67 (Comyn, J., concurring) (arguing that "as is" clause is relevant to the issue of causation);
Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852, 863 (Vt. 1991) (stating that "as is" clause is relevant to whether
representations were made and if there was reasonable reliance); Grube,496 N.W.2d at 117 (noting
that "exculpatory clause still may have evidentiary value for the purpose of showing that no
representations were relied upon").
260. See, e.g., Limoge v. People's Trust Co., 719 A.2d 888, 891 (Vt. 1998) ("The weight to
be given the clause in determining whether there was a misrepresentation and whether there was
justifiable reliance is to be decided by the fact-finder.").
261. See, e.g., Kezer v. Mark Stimson Assocs., 742 A.2d 898, 900 (Me. 1999) (noting that
purchasers viewed property and paid deposit on March 16, between March 16 and March 18
exchanged offers and counteroffers, and signed agreement on March 18).
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The purchasers often first see the house and review and sign the offer
to purchase on the same day.262 This timetable does not leave much time
for careful review and consideration ofwhat later becomes a contract upon
acceptance by the seller. Often the purchasers do not read the contract
word for word. A real estate agent may briefly explain some of the
contract provisions to the purchasers, but after receiving assurances and
compliments on finding such a great deal, the purchasers sign the contract.
In some cases, the purchasers may even initial the "as is" provision.
Unfortunately, the purchasers may never read the "as is" clause or other
disclaimer. By the time the purchasers get to the point of signing a
contract, they feel like they have run a marathon, and they lack the energy
or will to carefully scrutinize the purchase contract. Even if the purchasers
do carefully review the contract, they may quickly become overwhelmed
by the length and technicality of the contract language.263
Those conscientious purchasers who do carefully read the contract may
not appreciate the legal implications of the "as is" clause and other
disclaimers. 6 The drafters of these contracts recognize these problems
262. See, e.g., Loken v. Century 2 1-Award Properties, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 683,685 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (noting purchaser viewed property and on same day made written offer to seller); Menzel v.
Morse, 362 N.W.2d 465, 467 (Iowa 1985) (noting that after two fifteen minute visits on the same
day, purchasers made an offer); Myers v. McHenry, 580 A.2d 860, 861-62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(noting that purchasers looked at the home, real estate agent drafted the contract, and seller
accepted the offer on the same day); Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000)
(noting that purchasers were shown the lot and signed the real estate contract on the same day);
Silva, 589 A.2d at 855 (noting purchasers visited the property and immediately thereafter went to
the broker's office and signed the sales agreement); cf Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 799 (Wyo.
1995) (noting that purchasers visited the home and made an offer the next day).
263. For examples of real estate purchase contracts, see the form promulgated by the Texas
Real Estate Commission, available at www.propertysites.com/resource/header.php3; the form
approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission, available at www.commerce.utah.gov/
dre/forms/.html and a New York form sales contract found at 14 POWELL, supra note 60, at App
81D-9.
264. Purchasers often do not understand the full import of "as is" or other exculpatory
provisions. In Haygoodv. Burl PoundersRealty, Inc., 571 So. 2d 1086 (Ala. 1990), a purchaser
explained how she understood an "as is" provision:
I signed this statement when [the seller, who was also a realtor,] asked me to come
over to her house prior to the closing. When she pointed it out to me I asked her
what it meant. She said "This is just in case an appliance tears up so that y'all
can't come back against us." Based upon that explanation from her I signed the
statement.
Id. at 1088. In that case, plaintiffs purchased a used residence with a full basement after inquiring
of the sellers, one of whom was a realtor, about whether the basement leaked. Id. at 1087-88.
Sellers assured them that the basement was well constructed and did not leak. Id. at 1088. The
plaintiffs purchased the house on March 31st and in July the basement of the house collapsed. Id.
at 1087.
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and the risk that technical or obscure provisions may be held
unenforceable. They have responded by inserting into purchase contracts
warnings that the purchaser should consult an attorney.265 The problem
with such warnings is that many people do not have a lawyer nor are they
interested in adding another layer of expense to the real estate
transaction.2 "
Hiring a lawyer to review the contract also involves delay. Purchasers
may be told that the deal must be done "today" or the property will be sold
to someone else, the price will increase, or favorable interest rates will be
lost (or fill in some other sales pressure line). The sense of urgency and
timing then discourage careful review of the provisions and any
consultation with attorneys. Rightfully or wrongfully, many purchasers
may simply rely upon the integrity of the broker providing the form and
the fact that many forms are "approved" by respective real estate
commissions or other groups.
Even in less rushed situations, residential home purchasers, who vary
greatly in their education and experience, usually have not been involved
in many real estate sales. The whole process may be new to them. Even
those who have purchased homes before may not have done so recently or
may be in a different area where practices differ from the purchaser's prior
experience. The purchasers are vulnerable. Not unreasonably, they do rely
upon sellers, who usually have thorough knowledge of the property, and
real estate brokers, who by their profession hold themselves out as experts
(notwithstanding later disclaimers of any expertise).
Of course, sellers and brokers have interests to be protected too.
Freedom of contract,267 certainty in enforcement of those contracts,268 and

In Masseyv. Weeks Realty Co., 511 So. 2d 171 (Ala. 1987), a case involving substantial termite
damage, a purchaser understood the "as is" provision to mean "that if he 'found that the pipes were
inefficient or the roof had a leak in it or such as this, that that was my obligation to replace those
type things."' Id. at 173.
In Perrettv. Dollard,338 S:E.2d 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985), in the context of a partially finished
house, a real estate broker stated that he understood the particular "as is" provision at issue "to
apply only to that unfinished portion of the house, and not to the house as a whole." Id. at 57. The
court held that the "as is" clause was not ambiguous on its face and was not so limited. Id.
265. See Texas One to Four Family Residential Contract (Resale), Promulgated by the Texas
Real Estate Commission (10/29/2001),
24 (entitled "Consult Your Attorney"), available at
http:llwww.trec.state.tx.usformsrulespubs/forms/forms-contracts.asp;
Norman H. Wright,
Residential Real Estate, 6 NEB. LEGAL FORMS 1, 12 (1994) (stating, in Nebraska Purchase
Agreement, "[t]his is a legally binding contract. If not understood, seek legal advice.").
266. Of course, if a lawyer does review the purchase agreement, the probability of enforcing
the disclaimers dramatically increases. In such cases a court, properly so, may believe that the
purchaser was fully informed about the implication of the provisions and in fact agreed to accept
the risk. See Hamtil v. J.C. Nichols Real Estate, 923 P.2d 513,517 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (enforcing
disclaimer where purchaser's attorney reviewed and revised contract).
267. See Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 117 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (noting contract law
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limitation of potential future liabilities are important considerations. No
property is perfect, and neither the prior owner nor the real estate brokers
should be an insurer of the condition of the property. The parties need to
be able to confidently move forward with the assurance that the deal is
done and settled. This peace of mind allows the parties to rely upon the
completed transaction in making other decisions and entering new
transactions. The "as is" clause and other related provisions address these
needs by allocating risks. Clear, consistently enforced rules help to avoid
the expense and delay of litigation.
D. CourtsShould Sharply Limit Enforceability of "As Is" Clauses
Mandatory seller disclosures and real estate brokers' duty of candor,
whether imposed by statute or common law, provide significant protection
to purchasers of residential property. These advances should not be
threatened by non-negotiated, contractual disclaimers, inserted not by the
parties to the contract, but by real estate brokers. Judicial skepticism of
these provisions is warranted.
1. Brokers Have a Duty to Disclose Known Defects
The law should and does begin with the premise that a real estate
broker, as a licensed professional, has a duty of disclosure to potential
purchasers, regardless of whom the broker represents.269 This duty should
be to disclose material property defects of which the broker is aware, or
reasonably should have been aware, but should not require an independent
inspection of the property by the broker.' Purchasers reasonably should
expect brokers to be honest and forthright, but should not be permitted to
shift to brokers the responsibilities that purchasers can most effectively do
for themselves.27 ' Requiring purchasers to arrange for their own

interest of freedom of contract).
268. See id.(noting interest in protectingjustifiable expectations and security of transactions).
269. See supra notes 127 & 167 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
271. Courts require purchasers to protect themselves by inspecting the premises. See, e.g.,
Hamtil, 923 P.2d at 516 (enforcing "as is" clause where purchasers inspected property on multiple
occasions, had own inspectors, and were represented by attorney); Conahan v. Fisher, 463 N.W.2d
118, 119 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (holding buyer with proper inspection could have discovered
termite infestation); Bando v. Achenbaum, 651 N.Y.S.2d 74, 76 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding
that purchaser could have discovered extent of termite damage through exercise of reasonable
diligence); Dawson v. Tindell, 733 P.2d 407,408-09 (Okla. 1987) (holding realtor not liable where
purchaser should have known of defects from own inspection). Where the ability to inspect is
impaired, courts often excuse the failure to inspect. See, e.g., Draisner v. Scholsberg, 57 A.2d 202,
202-03 (D.C. 1948) (holding a purchaser entitled to rely upon an agent's misrepresentation of the
number of rooms where the purchaser was unable to inspect a locked house); Glanski v. Ervine, 409
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inspections minimizes any confusion over loyalty, communication of the
results, or the scope of the particular inspection.
2. The "As Is" Clause Should Be Negotiated or Actually Agreed To

The existence of an "as is" or similar limiting clause should not limit
brokers' duty of disclosure in residential real estate sales unless the broker
can prove that the disclaimer was a negotiated term or actually agreed to
by the purchasers. 2" This requirement ensures that the purchaser in fact
did enter the contractual provision knowingly and voluntarily. 73 Courts
should begin with a rebuttable presumption that such clauses were not
actually understood or agreed to by the purchasers. This presumption
comports more closely with the practical realities experienced by
purchasers, who often give little attention to such provisions.
To determine whether the parties actually negotiated and agreed to the
clause as part of the parties' bargain, a court should consider:
• who prepared or drafted the contract;274
* whether the clause was part of a printed form contract;275
* whether the parties actually communicated about or
276
discussed the particular clause;
* whether thepurchaser
specifically reviewed or understood
277
the clause;
A.2d 425, 429 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding "as is" clause requires purchaser to make a
reasonable investigation, but noting that debris in the cellar and poor lighting conditions prevented
a reasonable inspection); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.
1995) (holding, in case against seller, the purchaser was not bound by "as is" agreement if the
inspection was impaired or obstructed by seller).
272. See, e.g., Hamtil, 923 P.2d at 516 (stating provisions entered knowingly and voluntarily
are enforceable); Olmsted v. Mulder, 863 P.2d 1355, 1359 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
"disclaimer must be explicitly negotiated or bargained for").
273. See Hamil, 923 P.2d at 516.
274. See Parkhill v. Fuselier, 632 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Mont. 1981) (noting that contract was
prepared by an attorney for the realtors).
275. See Aranki v. RKP Invs., Inc., 979 P.2d 534, 537-38 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that
exculpatory clauses were on page six ofa standard form contract); PrudentialIns.Co., 896 S.W.2d
at 162 (holding that an exculpatory clause may be enforceable where it is an important part of the
basis of the bargain and not a "boiler-plate" provision).
276. See Aranki, 979 P.2d at 537-38 (holding exculpatory clauses did not immuhize
purchaser's agent and broker because the clauses were not negotiated terms); Hamtil, 923 P.2d at
516 (enforcing disclaimer where purchaser's attorney wrote "any?" in lines provided for
representations upon which purchaser relied); Olmsted, 863 P.2d at 1359 (holding "as is" clause
bargained for where purchaser discussed provision with his agent).
277. See Assilzadeh v. Cal. Fed. Bank, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176,187 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that purchaser understood that the unit was purchased in "as is" condition; therefore purchaser had
a duty to investigate); Ben Farmer Realty Co. v. Woodard, 441 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that the broker was not liable for passive concealment when the purchaser knew and
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whether the purchaser signed or initialed the clause;27
• whether the provision was conspicuous;279
* whether the2 provision appeared repeatedly in multiple
documents; 1
o
whether the provision
specifically sets forth the qualities
281
being disclaimed;
° whether the purchaser was represented by legal counsel
who reviewed the provision; 2 2"and
" the purchaser's sophistication and bargaining power.28 3
o

It should not be enough that a broker reviewed the contract language with
the purchasers and pointed out the provision. There should be some
explanation of the provision and acknowledgment by the purchaser.
Courts should give careful consideration to the specificity of the
clause 2 4 and be particularly scrutinizing of boiler-plate, one-size-fits-all

understood she was purchasing the house in its "as is" condition with many major defects); Crase
v. Hahn, 754 So. 2d 471,475 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the purchaser's own agent read "as
is" clause to the purchaser, and the purchaser acknowledged that she understood it); Omernik v.
Bushman, 444 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (enforcing, in a seller liability case, an "as
is" clause where purchasers read and understood the clause).
278. See Aranki, 979 P.2d at 538 (noting parties did not initial provision).
279. The sale of goods provides a useful analogy. The U.C.C. allows exclusion of warranties
of fitness of goods by use of "expressions like 'as is', 'with all faults' or other language" which call
the buyer's attention to the exclusion. See UCC § 2-316(3)(a) (2001). The "as is" or similar clause,
must be conspicuous or presented in such a way that a reasonable person would have noticed the
disclaimer. See 18 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 52:84, at 495-96 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing conspicuousness requirement for § 2316(3)). Whether a clause is conspicuous may depend upon the size, color, or type of print, or
location of the clause. Id. § 52:82, at 477-78 (discussing conspicuousness requirement).
280. See Larsen v. Carlene Langford & Assocs., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Tex. Ct. App.
2001) (noting that "as is" clause was contained in two separate, signed documents).
281. See Olmsted, 863 P.2d at 1359 (holding "as is" clause not effective because "it fail[ed]
to set forth with particularity the qualities and characteristics being disclaimed").
282. Parkhill v. Fuselier, 632 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Mont. 1981) (noting that purchasers were
not represented by an attorney).
283. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex. 1995)
(holding whether parties are in relatively equal bargaining positions is significant); Larsen, 41
S.W.3d at 252 (enforcing "as is" clause where purchaser was knowledgeable and sophisticated in
real estate business); Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 77 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding no
judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs were not represented by counsel and not
sophisticated business players).
284. See Rice v. Patterson Realtors, 857 P.2d 71, 74 (Okla. 1993) (enforcing "explicit waiver
relating to the flood history"); Olmsted, 863 P.2d at 1359 (holding "as is" clause not effective
because "it fail[ed] to set forth with particularity the qualities and characteristics being
disclaimed"); Grube v. Daun, 496 N.W.2d 106, 117 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that tort
disclaimers not honored "unless the disclaimer is specific as to the tort it wishes to disclaim[]" and
refusing to enforce "as is" clause against negligence and misrepresentation claims); cf Glanski v.
Ervine, 409 A.2d 425, 429, 430 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (noting that "as is" clause did not
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provisions stating that the purchaser buys the property "as is" or that the
purchaser has not relied upon any representations made by seller's agents.
Although the generality of a provision need not be fatal to enforcement of
a provision, a provision that is specific to the particular facts of a sale is
more likely to be the product of deliberation or consideration than the
standard, one-size-fits-all provision, included routinely in contracts. Not
only are general provisions more likely to be unnoticed and nonnegotiated, but equally problematic, they may be misunderstood. An
example of a specific provision that is likely to be understood is: "If Buyer
fails to: (i) investigate the flood and water history and water risk to the
Property, (ii) have the engineering inspection made, or (iii) deliver such
notice in the manner specified, Buyer accepts the flood and water history
and water risk attendant to the Property .... 2 8s This provision points
specifically to the type of risks disclaimed.
A more general "as is" provision should be enforced if the provision
identifies specific circumstances necessitating the "as is" provision. For
example, language disclosing that the dwelling has been unoccupied for
several years and suffers from numerous defects should support an "as is"
clause even though the clause is not specific about the defects disclaimed.
In this or.similar circumstances, the purchaser knows that defects do exist,
many of which may be unknown to the seller and broker. If the provision
was negotiated and agreed to, the specificity adequately puts purchasers
on notice that they need to do their own investigation or they bear the risk.
In the face of this type of specific information, reliance generally would
not be reasonable. Also, there may be so many defects that to catalogue all
the defects would be burdensome and could risk obscuring more material
defects. A rule of non-liability in these cases would avoid unnecessary
litigation.
If the provision is found to be negotiated and actually agreed to, it
should bar all claims against the listing broker, or other seller's broker,
within the scope of the provision, 286 except intentional misrepresentation
claims. Where a party, by intentional fraud, induces another to make an

specifically address termite damage).
285. Rice v. Patterson Realtors, 857 P.2d 71, 72 n.1 (Okla. 1993). Another example of a
specific clause is: "[P]urchaser acknowledges that [she] has not relied upon the advice or
representations, if any, by Broker (or agents of Broker) relating to... the structural condition of
the property ..... Ben Farmer Realty Co. v. Woodard, 441 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)
(alterations in original). What qualifies as a "structural condition," however, might itself be
ambiguous and would be strictly construed.
286. A provision by its terms may disclaim only specific risks or types of claims. See, e.g.,
Limoge v. People's Trust Co., 719 A.2d 888, 889 (Vt. 1998) (noting that the disclaimer applied
only to structures, heating and cooling, water supply, sewage disposal systems, and appliances, not
to boundaries or lot size).
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agreement, the agreement is voidable.287 Intentional fraud should continue
to be a basis for rescinding the agreement or avoiding the provision.
3. Claims Against Purchaser's Agents Should Be Unaffected by the
"As Is" Clause
Claims against a purchaser's own agent should be unaffected by these
provisions in sales contracts or related documents. The agent owes
fiduciary duties to the purchaser. 288 Any contractual limitations on the
liability of a purchaser's agent's should be explicitly identified in an
agreement specifically between the agent and the purchaser and not
slipped into the sales agreement between the seller and purchaser. The
purchaser's agent, who often provides or drafts the sales contract, is not a
party to the sales contract and should not be a third-party beneficiary of
such a contract. The purchaser and purchaser's agent did not negotiate
between themselves the term located in the sale agreement, nor is there
any consideration between them to support such a provision. A purchaser
would not expect to find a term limiting the purchaser's own agent's
liability in a contract between the seller and purchaser. Nor has the seller
insisted upon inclusion of a term intended to benefit the purchaser's agent.
Aranki v. RKP Investments, Inc.,289 illustrates the problem. In Aranki,
purchasers of a single family residence brought a negligent
misrepresentation claim against their own broker for failure to discover
and disclose the defective condition of the house, permitting plaintiffs to
waive warranties and to purchase the property "as is," and for advice
regarding extent of the defects.290 The broker and agent argued that the
purchasers had waived their tort claims under the exculpatory clauses in
the purchase contract, and the trial court agreed. 29' The exculpatory clauses
"released 'all brokers ... from any and all liability and responsibility
regarding the condition' of the property" and included an independent
investigations provision.292 The Arizona Court ofAppeals reversed the trial
court noting that the provisions were included on page six of a seven page
standard form purchase contract drafted by the Arizona Association of
Realtors (of which the defendants were members) and was provided and
filled out by the defendants.293 The court held that the release provisions

287. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) (noting that a contract induced
by fraud is voidable).
288. See BURKE, supra note 2, §§ 7.2-.5 (discussing fiduciary duties of real estate agents).
289. 979 P.2d 534 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
290. Id. at 535-36.
291. Id. at 536.
292. Id. at 537.
293. Id. at 537-38.
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did not appear to be negotiated terms and therefore were not
enforceable. 94
4. Proving the Merits of Plaintiff s Claims
If a court determines that an "as is" or other disclaimer was not
negotiated or actually agreed to or was not readily comprehensible, the
provision should not bar any claim against a real estate broker. The claim,
however, must still be established on its merits. The presence of such
clauses may continue to be relevant evidence on the issues of reasonable
reliance or the fact of misrepresentation, but they would not shield the
defendants as a matter of law. The same factors explored in determining
whether the provision was actually agreed to, noted above, may continue
to be relevant evidence. This approach is consistent with much of the
current case law.
Although declining to enforce "as is" clauses could result in purchasers
taking less care in their purchases, diminished enforcement of disclaimers
would not affect other incentives that encourage purchasers to exercise
care. Any claims against real estate brokers must still be proved, point by
point, on the merits. Issues regarding scienter,295 what representations were
made,296 materiality, and reasonable reliance297 all continue to protect real
estate brokers. Most purchasers do not intend to bring lawsuits with
attendant delays, risks, and uncertainties. Most purchasers are not happy
to discover unexpected problems after a sale that require often disruptive
remediation, even if those remediations are paid for by others.
V. CONCLUSION

The law as it concerns real estate broker liability to real estate
purchasers has matured from almost blanket immunity under the common
law principle of caveat emptor to liability under various theories rooted in
duties of open and honest disclosure. Courts have found liability based on
intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, innocent
misrepresentation, malpractice, breach of fiduciary duties, and violation
of specific statutory requirements. Perhaps most alarming to real estate
294. Id. at 538.
295. See, e.g., Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555,563 (Pa. 1999) (holding broker not liable because,
although representations were wrong, agent lacked intent and was not negligent).
296. See, e.g., Black v. Cosentino, 689 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (finding no
claim where realtor did not make any representations concerning condition of the property).
297. See, e.g., Alfa Realty, Inc. v. Ball, 733 So. 2d 423, 425 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (reversing
jury verdict and holding no reliance on broker's representations about the roof where plaintiff hired
engineer to inspect roof); Atkins v. Kirkpatrick, 823 S.W.2d 547, 552 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991)
(finding no proof of plaintiffs' reliance and noting that plaintiffs conducted their own
investigation).
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brokers, some courts have imposed a duty to inspect and liability for even
non-negligent misrepresentations. State legislatures have responded to
concerns of consumers and real estate brokers in the form of disclosure
acts and legislation defining real estate brokers' duties.
Use of the "as is" and similar exculpatory clauses in real estate sales
contracts in an effort to stave off real estate broker liability has met with
limited success. Most courts are skeptical of such provisions and limit
their application. Nonetheless, in many cases these provisions have been
held relevant if not controlling. The problem with these provisions is that
they are usually not negotiated terms but instead are unilaterally included
by sellers or real estate brokers, and purchasers often have only limited
understanding or awareness of the provisions. Courts should presume that
such provisions are not part of the parties' agreement unless the real estate
broker can establish that in fact the provisions were negotiated or actually
agreed to and that the provisions are adequately clear regarding the
qualities being disclaimed. These safeguards help to ensure that the
provisions were in fact part of the purchaser's understanding and
agreement.
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